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Dishing U.S. Foreign Policy: The Impact of Arab Satellite News Channels on Perceptions of the U.S. in the Middle East

AbstractThe past decade has seen a tremendous surge in satellite dish ownershipthroughout the Arab world, along with the emergence of several Arabic-language satellitenews stations. These networks rapidly became the preferred source of news across theMiddle East, as indicated by a combined audience of nearly 100 million daily viewers.This thesis explores the impact of Arab satellite news channels on their audiencesperceptions of the United States. This is a salient question, since these networks havesuccessfully federated viewers from all Arab countries into a large imaginedcommunity based on shared pan-Arab concerns, chief of which is a strong disapprovalof American foreign policy in the region. Thus these networks often cover the UnitedStates in a negative light, with the effect of reinforcing anti-American opinion amongtheir viewers. Anti-American positions are also considered safe bets by journalists asthey are often encouraged by local regimes as part of domest...



Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1 The Ubiquity of Satellite Dishes in the Middle East 1 Structure of the Thesis 3 Methodological Notes 5 Chapter 2: Indicators and Causes of Arab Public Opinion towards the U.S. 11 A Special Strain of Anti-Americanism 11 Decreasing Favorability Ratings for the U.S. Over the Past Decade 12 Political Versus Fundamental Anti-Americanism 13 Hating American Policy yet Loving the American Polity 15 Underlying Causes for Anti-U.S. Sentiments in the Arab World 16 Use of Anti-Americanism in Domestic Politics 19 The Reinforcing Effect of Arab Satellite News Channels 20 Chapter 3: Satellite Television: A Paradigm Shift in Arab Media 26 Arab Television before the Satellite Revolution 27 Arab Satellite News Channels: An Overview of the Main Actors 31 Al-Jazeera: A Case Study 35 Salient Features of Satellite News Channels 51 Chapter 4: Impacts of Reinforced Anti-Americanism on U.S. Interests 73 A New Arab Public 73 The Prospect of Democratically Elected Anti-American Governments 74 A Cold Reception of American Initiatives in the Middle East 75 The effect on Relations between the U.S. and Arab Heads of State 77 Chapter 5: U.S. Reactions to Arab Satellite News Channels - Past and Future 79 The American Reaction so Far: Antagonizing Rather than Engaging 79 The Failure of Al-Hurra 86 Policy Conclusions 89 Works Cited 100


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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION "Television is now part of the Arab family" (Wide). ON EVERY ROOFTOP: SATELLITE DISH UBIQUITY IN THE ARAB WORLD One of the first visible changes in Baghdad after the American-led war in 2003 was the emergence of satellite dishes on Iraqi rooftops. After two and a half decades of having to watch one of two state-controlled and heavily-censored television stations, Iraqi citizens went out in droves to purchase satellite dishes and gain access to what had previously been a rare commodity: credible information (Hasni). With a GNP per capita at barely $540 ("What"), it is telling that demand continued to outpace supply even as prices skyrocketed to $350 per dish (Hasni). Why were Iraqis willing to pay such a high premium for satellite television? More broadly, what can explain the satellite TV craze that seems to have taken root in the Middle East over the past decade? Indeed, in major cities throughout the Arab world today, most if not all housing for rent comes equipped with a satellite dish. People have come to see satellite television access in their homes as a normal utility, as seemingly indispensable as water or electricity (Ttrault 37). It may seem ridiculous to compare satellite television connectivity with access to water, yet a study conducted in Morocco found that while "58% of households surveyed had neither a bath nor a shower", a full 65% of respondents watched foreign television stations regularly (Tessler, "Contribution" 86)! Nor does the satellite dish epidemic stop at urban centers, as there have been countless reports of remote desert tents with parabolic antennas planted atop them (Al Haj).
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2 With an average regional price of only $100 per dish (Iraq notwithstanding), the cost of connectivity is low enough to ensure a high rate of satellite dish ownership across all socioeconomic classes (Miles 65), including the very poorest urban and rural communities as illustrated above. Moreover, the rate of sales and installations for satellite dishes in the region shows no sign of slowing. According to figures from the European satellite company Eutelsat, countries in the Middle East and North Africa have the highest growth rate of satellite television penetration in the world, as measured by a 23% increase between 2000 and 2001 (versus a mere 8% increase worldwide) (Rinnawi 43). And while it is difficult to know the exact number of satellite dishes in the region, all available studies point to a very high rate of satellite connectivity in the Middle East. According to several estimates, 90% of households in Algeria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia are equipped with satellite dishes, while the rates for Syria, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt range from 50% to 75% (Sakr, Arab 1). More broadly, a study by the Arab Advisors Group in 2007 found that "more than 85% of households in the Arab world have satellite television access" (Fam). Yet even the number of dishes is not an accurate indication of the actual amount of viewers with access to satellite television. For instance, one study in Algeria found that 90% of the population is organized into groups of one to three hundred people "subscribing to an informal cable system based on one or two shared dishes" (Rinnawi 45). All of which is to say that today satellite dishes are truly everywhere in the Middle East; The parabolic antennas have become a ubiquitous sight in the region, gracing the tops of buildings from the 7-star Burj Al Arab hotel in Dubai to the poorest slums in the West Bank.
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3 Yet beyond their presence on rooftops throughout the Arab world, the near ubiquity of satellite dishes in this region today poses a plethora of questions worth exploring: What type of programming are people watching? How much time do they spend watching satellite TV? Have satellite TV channels replaced or simply complemented terrestrial (state-owned) TV channels? And perhaps most importantly: What influence, if any, do satellite channels have on their viewers' beliefs? The answers to these questions are by no means simple, but the impact of the "satellite TV revolution" that has taken over Middle Eastern rooftops does seem worthy of exploration. Yet rather than a broad exploration of the satellite television landscape in the Arab world, the scope of this thesis is focused on 24-hour news channels, chief of which is the Qatari network Al-Jazeera. More specifically, this thesis seeks to explore how Arab satellite news channels contribute to their audiences' perceptions of the United States. This is a salient question, as there is no shortage of polls showing anti-American sentiments running at an all-time high in the Middle East. With the explosion of satellite dish ownership in the region over the past ten years, and given the unprecedented number of viewers tuning into Arab news channels each day, it is important to ask how these networks are affecting popular opinion towards the United States in the Arab world. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS Through a case study of Al-Jazeera, this thesis sets out to demonstrate that while Arab satellite news stations do have a certain bias in their coverage of the United States, these channels echo a political rather fundamental anti-Americanism that is largely
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4 shared by their audience and is mostly a response to American foreign policy in the region. More specifically, satellite television news channels consciously shape their programming to garner pan-Arab appeal. In so doing, these networks most often cover the United States in a negative light, with the effect of reinforcing anti-American opinions among their audiences. Anti-American positions are also considered "safe bets" by journalists as they are often encouraged by local regimes as part of domestic political calculations. Still, it seems that most if not all anti-US sentiments in the Middle East (and therefore, anti-US news coverage) can be brought to change if the United States enacts significant changes in both its foreign policy and public diplomacy towards the region. Yet the impact of satellite television news channels on Arab conceptions and opinions of the United States can only be understood within the wider context of the American presence in the region and the evolution of Arab media. This thesis thus begins with a chapter on the evolution and root causes of Arab popular opinion towards the United States over the past two decades. The next section provides a historical background on Arab media, highlighting the differences between the old state-controlled media and the new pan-Arab transnational satellite channels, with a case study of Al- Jazeera. I then explore the impact of the reinforced anti-Americanism induced by Arab satellite news channels on U.S. interests in the Middle East. I conclude with an assessment of American responses to Arab satellite news channels thus far and a series of policy suggestions aimed at establishing a better rapport between the United States and the new Arab media.
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5 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES Before delving into this analysis, it is important to address certain methodological choices and set out key definitions to frame the rest of the discussion. Time Frame Under Analysis Firstly, it is worth noting here that the scope of this thesis is focused on the period from 1999 to the present day. This time frame is due to a dearth of public opinion polls in the Middle East before 1999, combined with the fact that Arab satellite news channels rose to notoriety and acquired most of their audience starting only in 1998. Moreover, it is important to note that the same presidential administration served in the U.S. throughout this period. While the roots of Arab anti-Americanism are diverse and largely pre-date the current American administration, there is a wide consensus that George W. Bush's maverick "cowboy diplomacy and go-it-alone foreign policy" (Froomkin) have significantly aggravated matters. The fact that the current U.S. administration has been in place for the entire duration of the period under consideration in this thesis is thus a salient one, especially as relates to the prospects and potential for change with the election of a new American President in November 2008. Choice of Medium It is also important to point out that there are but a few news channels in a landscape of over 700 Arabic-language satellite stations competing for the same audience and offering content ranging from music videos to on-demand movie channels (Fandy 2). In such a diverse media landscape, the choice to focus on round-the-clock news stations is due to two simple reasons. Firstly, news networks capture the largest audiences of all Arabic-language satellite stations. Secondly, by virtue of their specialization on news and
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6 political events, these channels are the most likely to shape viewers' perceptions of the United States. Moreover, this thesis will focus exclusively on satellite news channels' treatment of the United States, with very little consideration of news coverage on issues pertaining to intra-Middle East politics in which the U.S. is not directly involved. Another important methodological note concerns the focus on satellite TV as opposed to print media or the Internet. The choice of this medium was driven by the belief that satellite TV is the most influential media in the lives of Arab people today, by mere virtue of its presence in almost all households. Print media is largely hampered in the region by high rates of illiteracy, low circulation numbers, and lack of distribution in non-urban regions (Miles 35). Thus according to one survey, 70% of Arabs receive their news from television, while only 1% stay informed through print media (Gockel and Kraig 6). The choice to focus on satellite TV instead of the Internet is also worth explaining. Indeed, it may be argued that the online space is theoretically a more powerful tool to federate and influence people than satellite TV, since the internet is a medium of instant communication while television is a unidirectional media of information. While this argument is valid on face value, it loses weight once actual usage rates for the two forms of media are taken into account. Indeed, according to the 2002 UN Arab Development Report, Arab countries have the lowest level of internet connectivity in the world, as measured by the number of connected computers per thousand people (Friedman).
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7 In addition, internet access remains costly and is thus largely the preserve of a "Western-oriented, English-trained and commercially successful" economic elite (Hafez 11), as opposed to the cheap cost and strong presence of satellite dishes in even the poorest areas. Moreover, the internet is very easily controlled by state censors, as access to certain web sites can be restricted on a country-wide level, while satellite TV signals cannot be blocked for long periods of time. The choice to focus on satellite TV rather than print media or the internet can therefore be attributed to the fact that satellite TV is by far more present in the daily lives of the average person in the Middle East. To give but an illustrative idea of the extent of satellite television's influence and presence in people's lives, one need look no further than the simple statistic that by the time most people are eighteen years old, they will have spent more time in front of a television set than in school (Craig and Minow 5). Satellite television stations are thus veritable "weapons of mass communication" (Hahn 20) whose pervasive reach throughout the Middle East has consequences that are worth exploring. Dearth of Public Opinion Polls in the Middle East Prior to 1999 Yet the absence of public opinion polls in the Arab World held prior to 1999 poses a significant methodological challenge for this thesis. Indeed, there was very little systematic survey research conducted in the Arab world until the early 2000s (Tessler, "Arab" 176). In fact, James Zogby, founder of the American polling firm Zogby International, writes in his analysis of a 2002 poll of eight Arab nations that this was first ever "systematic effort [] to determine how Arab public opinion feels about other countries in the world" (Zogby, What 61). This is a slight exaggeration; there was in fact
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8 some polling done in the region in 1999 by the now-defunct Office of Research at the US Department of State, but this data is sparse and is only available for Morocco. Even the widely-respected PEW Center for Research only began polling Middle Eastern countries in 2002. There are many reasons for this dearth of public opinion polling in the Middle East, which sociologist Barbara Ibrahim summarizes well in writing that "the Arab political environment is extremely hostile to scientific field research and deeply suspicious of the motives of serious and objective inquiry" (qtd. in Tessler, "Arab" 2). This is seconded by Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler who write that the "undemocratic character of most Arab countries made survey research impossible, or at least very difficult, and thus discouraged students with an interest in Arab politics from selecting topics that required this kind of research" (2). These difficulties are compounded by methodological problems inherent to countries under authoritarian regimes, including the challenge of building representative national samples (Jamal and Tessler 1), "the natural suspicion of strangers asking sensitive political questions, [and] the conflation of different sources of [popular] anger" (Lynch, "Anti" 196). At any rate, the absence of public opinion polls held in the Arab World prior to the current decade makes it very difficult to unequivocally assess or label a "satellite TV effect" on Arab popular opinion towards the U.S. after Al-Jazeera and other news channels emerged in the late 1990s. This is especially true since surveys show that the rise Arab anti-American sentiments over the past decade is largely due to American foreign policy and would thus most likely have taken place regardless of the existence of pan-Arab satellite news channels.
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9 I circumvent the methodological hurdle posed by the lack of survey research prior to 1999 by using a set of studies by Cornell University researchers who isolated the effect of watching Arabic-language news channels on Arab perceptions of the U.S. through a variety of statistical methods. Defining Key Terms: Arab World, Arab, Anti-Americanism I use the term Arab in accordance with the 1946 definition set out in the Arab League Charter, as a "a person whose language is Arabic, who lives in an Arabic speaking country, and who is in sympathy with the aspiration of the Arabic-speaking peoples" (Francona). The idea of pan-Arab aspirations and the Arab world as a "culture continent" characterized by a strong sense of shared culture and destiny is one I will return to in greater depth in later chapters (Patai 10). It is also important to define the geographic perimeter which I have already referred to numerous times above as the Arab world or the Middle East. Within the scope of this thesis, the terms "Arab world" and "Middle East" are used interchangeably to refer to the 22 member nations of the Arab league as well as Iraq and the Palestinian territories. 1 It should be noted that a clear majority of these countries are currently governed by unelected and authoritarian regimes, with power concentrated in the hands of a small elite if not a single man. In 2006, the World Bank estimated the total population of this region to be 311 million people (six percent of the global population), 40 to 50 million of whom are daily 1 The member states of the Arab League are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
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10 viewers of Al-Jazeera 2 ("Middle"). The region has the youngest population in the world, with 38% of inhabitants under 14 years of age (Seib 607). This is also a region of massive economic inequalities, with roughly 20% of the population living on less than $2 a day while the ruling elites are notoriously well-off (more than a third of Forbes Magazine's Richest Royals are from the Middle East) (Seib 604). Yet by employing the terms "Arab world" and "Middle East" throughout this thesis, I am implicitly treating the region as though it were a single block. Yet it is important to acknowledge that there are significant political, cultural, socioeconomic, and even linguistic differences between the countries in this part of the world. I allow myself the luxury of ignoring these intra-regional nuances for several reasons, chief of which is the fact that these countries' populations combine to form a single audience for Arab satellite news channels. Moreover, the treatment of the Middle East as a contiguous block also mirrors the definition that seems to be driving the formulation of American foreign policy towards the region, as a single arc stretching from "Marrakech to Bangladesh". The policy conclusions articulated at the end of this thesis are thus reached through an analysis that employs the same frame of reference towards the region as the one often used by American officials. Lastly, the term anti-Americanism is defined as "the expression of unfavorable attitudes towards the U.S." (Anti-Americanism), and the term public diplomacy is taken to mean the task of "direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking, and ultimately, that of their governments" (Gilboa 291). 2 There is no way to obtain accurate viewership numbers for satellite television channels, but estimates for Al-Jazeera's daily audience range from 35 to 50 million depending on sources, with peaks of up to 60 million viewers during military crises (Control Room).
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11 CHAPTER 2: INDICATORS AND CAUSES OF ARAB OPINION OF THE U.S. The effect of Arab satellite news channels on popular opinion towards the United States in the Middle East over the past decade must be framed within the wider context of several historical events which strongly shaped Arab perceptions of the U.S. This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the unique nature of Arab anti-Americanism as opposed to anti-Americanisms in other parts of the world. The results of public opinion surveys in the Middle East are then used to highlight growing dislike of the United States among Arab populations over the past ten years, as well as to distinguish between political and fundamental anti-Americanism in the region. This is followed by a brief historical overview of central episodes that shaped perceptions of the U.S. in the Middle East. The chapter concludes with an analysis of several studies showing that Arab satellite news channels reinforce (but do not create) anti-American opinions held by their viewers. A Special Strain of Anti-Americanism A first distinction that needs to be drawn regards the uniqueness of Arab anti- American sentiments. Indeed, it is tempting to dismiss mounting anti-U.S. sentiments in the Arab world as part of a global trend of dislike towards the United States, yet a cursory glance at public opinion polls comparing U.S. favorability ratings across the world reveals that anti-American sentiments are significantly stronger in the Middle East than anywhere else.
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12 For instance, according to the 2003 Global Attitudes survey by the Pew Research Center, the average favorability rating for the US in Britain, Germany, and France between 2002 and 2004 was of 69%, while the equivalent figure for Morocco and Jordan was a mere 33% (Pew, "Global"). This and other public opinion polls only confirm what has long been argued by specialists on the region, namely that anti-Americanism in the Middle East is significantly stronger and more virulent than anywhere else in the world (Darwish). In addition, an equally important distinction needs to be made to show that anti- Americanism in the Middle East is not merely part of blanket anti-Western sentiments. This is clearly expressed by James Zogby who warns against concluding that Arab anti- Americanism is the result of a general anti-Western mindset given that a majority of survey respondents across the Arab world have a very positive view of France as well as Canada and Germany" (What 4). Decreasing Favorability Ratings of the U.S. over the Past Decade There has been no shortage of public opinion polls conducted in the Middle East over the past ten years, all of which confirm and chronicle the precipitous decline in favorability ratings for the U.S. in the region. In fact, the only incidence of a favorability rating for the U.S. that is above the 50% threshold is from a 1999 State Department survey in Morocco. Since 2000, every single poll conducted in the region has shown drastically low levels of support for the United States which fell even further after the 2003 war in Iraq.
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13 This is best illustrated by the yearly polls of highly representative national samples conducted by Zogby International in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon from 2002 to 2006. The surveys reveal a marked increase in anti-American sentiments in the region, with the average favorability rating towards the U.S. falling from 25% in 2002 to 15% in 2006 (House). These findings are corroborated by Pew surveys in Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon (Pew, "U.S."). Lastly, the most recent available data for the region from a 2007 Gallup poll of 12 Middle Eastern nations shows an average favorability rating for the United States of only 17% (English). Political Versus Fundamental Anti-Americanism Yet what exactly do these low favorability numbers for the U.S. mean? What is the nature of the sentiments behind these unfavorable ratings? And perhaps most importantly, what drives Arabs' dislike of the United States? To better answer these questions, it is useful to distinguish between two types of anti-Americanism, one based on American foreign policy and the other based on a more visceral repudiation of all things American. Indeed, Robert Keohane highlights that the term anti-Americanism conflates two distinct views: political anti-Americanism which opposes American foreign policy but is susceptible to change with new information, and fundamental anti-Americanism which is a bias and an opposition to what America is that is highly unlikely to change with new information (Anti-Americanism). Giacomo Chiozza further develops this model, describing political anti- Americanism as being "centered on the political actions the United States pursues in the international arena", while fundamental anti-Americanism rejects America as a "societal,
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14 cultural, and political arrangement premised on freedom, opportunity, and individual achievement" (4). Given the dominant dislike of the U.S. expressed by Arabs in the popular opinion polls discussed above, the question remains, to what extent does each of these two types of anti-Americanisms contribute to anti-U.S. sentiments in the Middle East? Mark Lynch, author of several books on Arab media, writes that there is undeniably a "powerful anti- American schema" in Arab political and media rhetoric today, such that the argument that really matters is not between pro and anti-Americans but rather between "a political anti- Americanism that believes that U.S. policy could change for the better and a [fundamental] anti-Americanism that rejects U.S. values [and] views America as irredeemably corrupt" ("Anti" 210). The main risk today is thus for political anti- Americanism to transition into a more radical fundamental anti-Americanism "at the margin of political dialogue" (Anti-Americanism). As of now though, there is very little support for the idea that Arab anti- Americanism is of the fundamental type, rooted in essentialist cultural conflicts. Rather, it seems that Arab popular opinion towards the U.S. mostly moves in line with American policies in the region. This is largely confirmed by results of the 2004 Zogby survey of 3, 300 adults in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and the U.A.E. When respondents were asked to describe the worst thought that comes to mind when they hear the word "America", the issue foreign policy in general and policy towards the Arab people in particular was cited in nearly 80% of responses (Zogby International, "Impressions" 7).
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15 Foreign policy thus seems to be at the heart of Arab anti-Americanism. As Mark Tessler writes, "antipathy toward the U.S. [does] not flow from cultural dissonance; it is based not on who [Americans] are perceived to be but on what [Americans] are perceived to do" (Tessler 180). To return to Robert Keohane's framework, anti-Americanism in the Middle East seems to be largely political rather than fundamental, although it has elements of both. In essence, anti-American attitudes in the Middle East are ingrained enough for people to be wary of superficial changes in American treatment of the region, but are also fluid enough for them to be sensitive and receptive to genuine changes in U.S. foreign policy (Lynch, "Anti" 197). Hating American Policy yet Loving the American Polity The argument that anti-American sentiments in the Middle East are political rather than fundamental is buttressed by poll results showing that Arabs still hold a strong appreciation for American democracy, education and culture even while being strongly opposed to American foreign policy. In fact, several observers of the Middle East have noted that there is a long-standing tradition of deep admiration for American values in Arab political culture, and the "ideals of national independence and freedom resonate well with many Arabs" (Lynch, "Anti" 201). For example, the 2004 Zogby poll in Jordan revealed that "83% of Jordanians said they admired American technology; 57% admired American freedoms, ; and 56% liked American television, even as only 8% approved of US policy toward Arabs and 2 percent supported US policy toward Iraq" (Lynch, "Anti" 198). More broadly, James Zogby concludes from a series of polls in Arab nations from 2002 to 2006 that "Arabs display favorable attitudes toward many manifestations of America in their midst, including
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16 American-made products, science and technology, movies and television, etc.-it is clear that what drives down Arab attitudes towards America is quite simply, the U.S. policy in the region" (What 64). Similarly, Chiozza writes that "a large portion of respondents speak of America with two minds: appreciatively when they are induced to evoke aspects of America's polity and negatively when they are asked to focus on America's foreign policy" (Chiozza 34). Survey findings thus support the thesis of a political rather than fundamental anti- Americanism in the Middle East, as most respondents were found to have a "strong dislike for American foreign policy but a much more nuanced, and often quite positive, attitudes toward American society and culture and toward the American people" (Tessler, "Arab" 179). Low favorability ratings of America in the Middle East should therefore not be taken as a manifestation of cultural hostility but rather as the result of policy considerations (Chiozza 42). "Why do They Hate Us?": Underlying Causes for Anti-US Sentiments in the Arab World Having established that the bulk of anti-American sentiment in the Arab world is due to considerations relating to U.S. foreign policy in the region, it is imperative to highlight the specific elements of American policy that are driving Arab discontent. Indeed, allotting a significant amount of airtime to issues on which U.S. policy is widely disliked is one of the main ways in which Arab satellite news channels can be said to reinforce the anti-American feelings of their viewers. First off, it is worth noting that the main drivers of Arab frustration with U.S. foreign policy are relatively recent, dating back only to the 1960s. Before then, it is widely agreed on that America enjoyed an excellent reputation in the Middle East,
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17 benefiting from the work of American missionaries who founded major universities throughout the Arab world, including the American University of Cairo and the American University of Beirut. America's image in the Arab world arguably reached its apex after World War I, when Woodrow Wilson's support for self-determination resonated strongly among nationalist elites in the Arab world (Makdisi 544). However, U.S. support for the overthrow of the enormously popular Iranian Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadeq in 1953, combined with America's cold reception of Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabist movement in the in the 1960s marked two of the major episodes that fed the nascent anti-American sentiment in the region (Lynch, "Anti" 199). Arab anti-Americanism then began to take on stronger tones after the 1967 Arab- Israeli War, as "U.S. support for Israel reshaped a relatively fluid Arab political opinion into a more pervasive distrust." (Lynch, "Anti" 199). More generally, the politicization of the United States in favor of conservative authoritarian governments led to a perception that the U.S. was determined to crush Arab aspirations (Makdisi 549). The American government thus rapidly came to be regarded as a force keeping the Arab world from its rightful place in the global order. With a significant military presence and a key role in Arab-Israeli negotiations, the United States' heavy involvement in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War further cemented America at the center of Arab concerns (Lynch, "Anti" 199). Yet the scope of this thesis has been narrowed to the current decade. The question is thus to understand the salient factors driving Arab dislike of America in recent years. Among these, the first and most important by far is the American backing of Israel, especially during the second intifada that began in September of 2000 and more recently
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18 during Israel's war against the Lebanese party of Hizbollah in the summer of 2006. Yet even apart from the policy of support for Israel, which can be debated in its own right, the U.S. has made countless gaffes in the communication and articulation of this policy, reflecting a complete misunderstanding of (or disregard for) the Arab public sphere. To name but one example, President Bush's description of former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as a "man of peace" during a news conference at the height of the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank in 2002 made the headlines of all Arab media and became an instant symbol of America's blind support for Israel (Lynch, "Losing"). The absolute centrality of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Arab discourse cannot be overemphasized. For instance, when participants in the 2002 Zogby International poll were asked to sort ten concerns in order of importance, an overwhelming majority of respondents ranked the rights of Palestinian people higher than "civil and personal rights" and personal economic concerns (Zogby, What 3). The issue of Palestine is thus a truly seminal question in Arab thinking, and no account of anti-Americanism in the Arab world that does not address Arab opinion towards Israel "can even begin to convey the nature, the depth and the sheer intensity of Arab anger at the United States" (Makdisi 552). All available evidence points towards a profound Arab identification with the plight of Palestinians, such that U.S. policies towards Israel inevitably affect Arab attitudes toward the United States (Lynch, "Anti" 205). Beyond American support for Israel, the 2001 war in Afghanistan, the Abu Ghraib prison scandals of 2004, the continuing illegal detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, the false pretenses for the war in Iraq, and the mishandling of the occupation in Iraq have all deepened levels of anti-Americanism in the Arab world
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19 (Kaplan). Once again, this is reflected in recent Zogby polls from 2005 and 2006, which show that the situation in Iraq and America's treatment of Arabs both domestically and abroad are among the most salient factors driving Arab opinion towards the United States (Linzer). Seizing on Anti-Americanism for Domestic Purposes The last factor that must be taken into account in understanding anti-Americanism in the Arab world is that Arab leaders themselves have often encouraged anti-American sentiments as part of domestic political calculations. This idea has been most notably developed by Barry Rubin, editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs. According to Rubin, anti-Americanism has long been used by Arab leaders "as a foil to distract public attention from other, far more serious problems within these societies". Anti-Americanism also provides a venue for "intellectuals and journalists to vent their anger against a government-approved target rather than risk criticizing injustices or failures at home" (Rubin). Furthermore, Robert Keohane notes that America has a special "resonance with the world" that no other powers have, making it a natural place onto which Arab leaders project their people's frustrations and concerns (Anti-Americanism). Anti-Americanism is thus sometimes leveraged by Arab leaders as a means of distracting and refocusing popular resentment from domestic to foreign issues. This is important to keep in mind, since the tacit approval of anti-American journalism by regional governments provides a strong motive for Arab satellite news channels to cover issues that evoke anti-American sentiments among their viewers. I return to this idea in some detail in the next chapter.
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20 Yet even while acknowledging that Arab leaders may make use of anti- Americanism as part of domestic political considerations, it is important to make clear that they do not create it from scratch, and US actions are undeniably at the root of anti- American popular opinion. Between its imposition of embargoes, its sales of weapons to some regional states against others, and its engagement in no less than fifteen direct military operations in the region between 1980 and 2001, the United States has continually built up Arab resentment over the past two decades, and American foreign policy is responsible for bulk of Arab anti-American sentiments (Nydell 116). Assessing the impact of Satellite TV on Arab Perceptions of the U.S. The above sections have highlighted the salient features of Arab popular opinion towards the United States. In essence, polls show that Arab anti-Americanism has clearly been on the rise since the early 2000s and these anti-U.S. sentiments are sometimes encouraged or leveraged by authoritarian leaders to deflect popular anger from domestic problems. The question is then to understand how Arab satellite news channels play into this framework. Indeed, with survey results showing that Arab satellite news channels are the main source of knowledge on the U.S. for most people throughout the Middle East (Dawoud), it is important to understand how these channels affect their viewers' perceptions of the United States. Although there is quite a large body of literature on the topic of Arab satellite news channels, there have been very few empirical studies based on surveys designed to isolate the way in which these networks impact public opinion. Several opinions have been voiced on the matter, from senior cadres of the Bush administration lambasting Al- Jazeera for its supposedly drastic impact on Arab public opinion to studies claiming that
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21 there is absolutely no correlation between watching Arab satellite TV and strong anti- American sentiments (Center for Strategic 68). The actual effect of satellite news channels seem to be somewhere between these two extremes. More specifically, the theory with the most credence today seems to be that Arab satellite news channels have a reinforcing or amplifying effect on pre-existing anti- American opinions held by their viewers. Thus, a 2004 statistical analysis by Cornell University researchers based on results of a 2002 Gallup poll of 10, 000 adults across nine Muslim countries found that satellite news channels have "amplifying effects on the main effects of attention to news coverage" (Nisbet et al. 11). In other words, Arab satellite news channels amplify anti-Americanism in the region by providing heavy coverage of events which already elicit anti-American opinions among their viewers. The study isolated the influence of Arab satellite news channels by comparing perceptions of the U.S. in the five Arabic-speaking Muslim countries surveyed (Morocco, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) with those in the four non-Arabic speaking countries (Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, and Pakistan). Within the Arabic-speaking nations, perceptions of the U.S. held by "pan-Arab media users" (defined as viewers of Al-Jazeera and MBC, two of the most popular Arabic-language satellite channels) were then compared to those held by "Western media users" (viewers of BBC, CNN, CNN International, and MSNBC) (Nisbet et al. 24). Unsurprisingly, the study finds that "individuals turning to pan-Arab regional networks [] are more negative in their perceptions of the United States after all controls, whereas individuals turning to western networks [] are significantly less negative in their perceptions of the United States" (Nisbet et al. 28). More specifically,
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22 the study's results show that within the population that pays close attention to international news, people who watch Arab news channels have their anti-American perceptions amplified. In contrast, watching Western news channels such as the BBC or CNN is found to have a "buffering effect", diminishing anti-American sentiments (Nisbet et al. 11). While interesting, the effect of Western channels on anti-American views is largely irrelevant in the Middle East, as audience numbers indicate that there are infinitely more "pan-Arab media users" than "Western media users" in the region (Sakr, "Approaches" 6). The findings of Nisbet et. al. are largely confirmed by results from the 2004 six- nation Zogby International poll of 3, 300 Arabs. Respondents who derive their information about America from hearing or seeing Arabic commentaries on Arab television have significantly less appreciative attitudes toward U.S. policies (Zogby International, "Impressions" 17). Both the Zogby poll and the Cornell University study thus confirm that Arab satellite news channels have a significant "amplifying effect" on anti-American views held by their audience (Nisbet et al. 29). At the same time, the researchers highlight in their conclusions that while Arab satellite channels are capable of magnifying or reducing
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23 views held by their audience, they are "unlikely to create public opinion anew". "Rather, the media are likely to move already extreme anti-American perspectives in small directions" (Nisbet et al. 20). The effect of watching Arab versus Western news channels can thus only explain a very small part of the variance in public opinion. For the Arab public, "the difference in media effects for receiving news through either Al-Jazeera or a Western news network is a matter of degree, not direction" (Nisbet et al. 32). The limited role of Arab satellite channels as a root cause for anti-Americanism in the region is also supported by the parallel rise of anti-Americanism in non-Arabic speaking countries of the Middle East such as Iran and Turkey (Lynch, "Anti" 205). Still, Arab satellite news channels appear to be in a cycle of reflection and reinforcement of their viewers' anti-American opinions. Moreover, this cycle is fed by viewers' tendencies to seek out and become loyal to news sources where they are most likely to find "coverage with which they expect to agree" (Nisbet et al. 29). Indeed, Nisbet et al. refer to the concept of a "perceptual screen" through which people filter their news, such that a viewer who already has anti-American views will likely use this underlying predisposition as a filter, making him or her much more open to accepting considerations featured in the news that fit with his or her preconceived notions about the United States (29). Paul Starr, a Princeton University professor and a renowned expert on media studies, articulates a similar idea, arguing that the media have a limited effect in changing opinions but a "strong reinforcing effect [] because of self-selection: people tend to read or listen to things they agreed with, [interpret] materials according to their preconceptions, and [have a selective] memory" (398).
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24 The tendency of viewers to choose their news source as a function of their own political views is confirmed by Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro's model for media bias, which stipulates that "a consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will infer that the source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer's prior expectations" ("Bias" 280). In reaction, media sources tend to slant their reports towards the prior beliefs of their customers so as to build a reputation for quality (Gentzkow and Shapiro, "Bias" 280). Thus Gentzkow and Shapiro's theory provides some explanation as to why Arab satellite news channels focus a significant amount of their airtime covering Palestinians or Iraqis as victims of an unfair American foreign policy: this helps these channels build credibility among their audience. As discussed above, this type of coverage also reinforces anti-American predispositions among viewers. Arab satellite news channels and their viewers are thus seemingly ensnared in an unending loop, wherein the networks build and maintain their legitimacy among viewers by covering issues in a fashion likely to resonate with viewers' anti-American sentiments, but this in turn has the effect of reinforcing these sentiments and increasing viewers' expectations for similar coverage. Yet the influence of Arab satellite news channels should not be summarily reduced to a reinforcing effect on anti-American opinions in the Middle East. To return to Robert Keohane's two types of anti-Americanism, all available data points towards satellite channels as increasing political but decreasing fundamental anti-American views. Indeed, studies suggest that people who are connected to satellite television are
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25 significantly more likely to appreciate America on its "cultural, political and institutional dimensions" (Chiozza i). Having conducted a detailed study of Al-Jazeera viewers, Mark Lynch finds that watching the Qatari network intensifies preexisting hostility towards American foreign policy among its viewers, but also makes them significantly "more supportive of values such as democracy and freedom" ("Anti" 205). Similarly, results from the Zogby International 2002 poll of ten Arab countries found that respondents with access to satellite TV were significantly more favorably disposed to "American science and technology" than those with no such access ("Ten"). In summation, available studies show that Arab satellite news stations have a certain reinforcing effect on the anti-American opinions of their viewers. Moreover, it has been found that anti-Americanism in the region is largely political rather than fundamental, and is mostly a response to American foreign policy in the Middle East. It is especially difficult to establish causation between watching Arab satellite news channels and holding anti-American sentiments, given a rapid succession of American actions in the Middle East in the recent past which fueled dislike of the U.S. among local populations. Yet given the massive penetration of satellite dishes in Arab households and the mostly negative portrayal of the US that is made on Arab satellite news channels, this new medium played a clear role in further aggravating anti-American opinions. The next chapter seeks to analyze the ways and means by which these satellite actors cover the news and shape their viewers' opinions.
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26 CHAPTER 3: SATELLITE TELEVISION: A PARADIGM SHIFT IN ARAB MEDIA "In August 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, state-run media in the Arab world suppressed the news for three days. Today, word of such an attack would be out within minutes because of a television station called Al-Jazeera." The New York Times ("Why") The previous chapter mapped out a general framework on the evolution and root causes of Arab popular opinion towards the United States, as well as the role of Arab satellite news channels in shaping these perceptions. This chapter delves into the goals of these new actors in the Arab public sphere and the means by which they exert their influence on Arab public opinion. Yet a brief historical overview of the Arab television landscape is necessary in order to understand the powerful influence of Arab satellite news channels. Indeed, the emergence of satellite networks in the late 1990s represented a genuine paradigm shift in both the form and purpose of Arab television. This chapter begins with a section on state- run TV stations in the Arab world. This is followed by an overview of the main actors of the satellite TV space, with a case study of Al-Jazeera to illustrate the salient features of 24-hour Arab news channels and their treatment of the United States. This is followed by a discussion of the most important changes brought on by satellite news channels as opposed to state-run television stations, with particular attention to how satellite networks federate viewers into an "imagined community" based on shared pan-Arab concerns, chief of which is a strong dislike of the United States.
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27 "LEARN AND SHUT UP": ARAB TV BEFORE THE SATELLITE REVOLUTION A State-controlled Monologue "While the whole world was issuing press releases by the second on the deteriorating health of the late king [Hussein], Jordanian television was broadcasting documentaries on the colors of nature and their meanings and impacts" (Kilani 11). This quote from Sa'eda Kilani's book Freedom Fries: Fried Freedoms perfectly illustrates the profound disconnect that existed between current events as they unfolded in reality and as they were portrayed on television in the Arab world up until the emergence of satellite news channels in the late 1990s. The threat of social unrest has always been a real concern for Arab authoritarian regimes with troubled economies, widespread financial inequalities, no government accountability, and political power concentrated in the hands of a small elite (United 129). Within this context, it is not surprising that from the very beginning of electronic broadcasting in the 1950s, Arab governments recognized the potential for television to mobilize citizens politically. This understanding rapidly led to the "nationalization and formal government control of most mass media channels" (Nisbet et al. 17), such that television stations essentially became "state-controlled monologues" designed to reaffirm the legitimacy of current regimes (Rinnawi ix). Thus with very few exceptions, all terrestrial television stations in the Arab world belonged to the Ministry of Information, and uncensored news broadcasts were almost non-existent (Rinnawi 128). Arab television was characterized by one-sided views and a marked tendency to glorify the state and its leader. It was common for a day's programming to feature hours of official ceremonies and images of the head of state greeting foreign dignitaries at the
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28 airport, with virtually no political commentary ("Al-Jazeera Effect"). The main interest of state television was thus to serve the government and more specifically the ruler, such that "until the 1990s the Arab media still followed, in spirit at least, a decree laid down in 18645 by the Sultan of the Ottoman empire that required journalists to "report on the precious health of the Sultan"" (Miles 25). The actions of the Arab heads of state were the prism through which the day's information was filtered. According to Mouin Rabbani, editor for the Middle East Report "if you go back through the record, you will find that the news was not "Nelson Mandela released from prison" or "hundreds of thousands dead in Rwanda" but rather "King/President X congratulates Mandela on his release from prison" or "expresses alarm at the situation in central Africa"" (qtd. in Thalif). More generally, the relationship between media institutions and political establishments was largely one of "acquiescence, submission, intimidation, and imbalance" (Ayish, "Changing" 129). While the situation was more nuanced within each country, with some television stations being given slightly more editorial leeway than others, the global picture in the region remained one of intense state oversight. William Rugh's typology of Arab media is highly illustrative of this point, as it divides the media landscape into three broad categories, all of which imply a large degree of state control; "mobilized" media characterized by near-complete subordination to the political power, "loyalist" media owned by a business elite whose members were very close to the government, and a "diverse" media with more freedom but which still steered clear of red lines imposed by the regime (40).
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29 The television landscape in the Arab world prior to the launch of satellite news channels thus fits squarely within the historical pattern of despotic regimes assuming state control over communications in order to consolidate their power. Indeed, Paul Starr writes that "control and centralization [of the media] have a long historical connection" in closed authoritarian societies (9). Fearing that freedom of expression may enable alternative viewpoints or opposition, despotic regimes often impose draconic censorship on the media (United 84), resulting in a public sphere that is stale but docile. Beyond generic trends of media censorship in authoritarian regimes, Faical al Qasim, host of one of Al-Jazeera's most controversial and popular talk shows, argues that state censorship and the top-down government management of television stations in the Arab world is also a strong reflection of a patriarchal Arab culture: "Be it in the social, political, or intellectual domain, Arab culture and politics are dictatorial and unilateral. At home, there is the dictatorial authority of the father and the eldest brother, with whom it is impossible to engage in a discussion. In the mosque, one cannot question the imam, and if you do, he brands you as an infidel. In business, CEOs behave like pharaohs. In every public administration, it's the same thing. Which brings us to politics. [Each country's leader] is the dictator, the only hero! The model of Arab leadership castrates everything. We do not know the meaning of dialogue. State television stations are merely a reflection of Arab culture: learn and shut up." (Al- Jazeera). In summation, state control of television stations in the Arab world led to a highly "strangled public sphere" (Fergany 204) in which debate was suppressed and free thinking was all but eliminated. There was very little journalistic freedom, and television stations largely abided by the so-called "National List", wherein the newscast could not
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30 contain any material that harmed or insulted "national unity, national currency, national economy, national interests, and national responsibility" (Kilani 48). Implications and Consequences of State-run Television The first implication of the strict government control over television channels in the Arab world is that newscasts were designed to encourage viewers to focus on the nation, placing a heavy emphasis on official ceremonies and national news to the exclusion of foreign affairs (Rinnawi 5). Thus apart from occasional instances when political leaders used state television broadcasts to fan anti-American sentiments and distract from economic failings or other domestic problems (as discussed in the previous chapter), there was generally very little coverage of the United States on television newscasts in each country (Al-Jazeera). The minimal presence of the U.S. on news broadcasts of state-controlled television channels is important to note as it stands in stark contrast with the very frequent coverage of the country that came with the emergence of satellite television news channels. Another implication of the state control over television stations is that newscasts came to be seen as indicators of countries' official positions towards all matters, especially ones relating to foreign policy (Kilani 75). This would later be one of the major points of contention faced by Al-Jazeera as the channel struggled to assert its editorial independence while the Qatari State Department received a constant stream of grievances from countries insulted by Al-Jazeera's coverage. Yet by far the biggest consequence of Arab states' dominance over their television channels prior to the satellite revolution is that there emerged a deep and long- lasting distrust between Arab viewers and the newscasts of their national television
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31 channels. Television channels were viewed with suspicion as a clear "appendage of the government" (Miles 25). Moreover, years of government censorship created an extraordinary appetite for open debate in the region and a profound unease among journalists who had to conciliate daily between their "true and professed beliefs", threatening a huge explosion that eventually took form in the widespread of defection of both audiences and journalists to the freer realm of satellite television the late 1990s (El- Affendi 188). ARAB SATELLITE NEWS CHANNELS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ACTORS The emergence of several Arabic-language 24-hour satellite news channels in the late 1990s and early 2000s represented a veritable paradigm shift in the Arab media landscape. The following section provides a panorama of this new field, highlighting the origins, source of funding, and treatment of the United States found on each of the major channels, with a case study of Al-Jazeera. Al Arabiya Created in 2003 and funded by a $300 million investment of the Saudi-controlled Middle East Broadcasting Corporation, Al-Arabiya (which translates into "The Arab One") is second only to Al-Jazeera in terms of daily viewership in the Middle East (Feuilherade). The channel is based in Dubai, and was set-up largely as a Saudi response to the Qatari network, with the clear goal of rivaling and serving as a counterweight to Al-Jazeera (Al-Haj). In effect, Saudi editorial oversight was guaranteed from the beginning since Al-Arabiya's parent company is owned by a brother-in-law of the late King Fahd Al Saud, who served as Saudi Arabia's ruler until he passed away in 2005 (Miles 220).
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32 Officially, Al-Arabiya promotes itself as a "more moderate alternative to Al- Jazeera" (Lynch, Voices 42). Like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya spends much of its airtime covering foreign affairs, yet it does this while being highly sensitive to official Saudi foreign policy and significantly more forthcoming towards other Arab regimes (qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). The channel has benefited from the strategic alliance between the Saudi kingdom and the United States, landing several interviews with top U.S. officials in exchange for a softer treatment of American foreign policy on its programs ("Al-Jazeera Effect"). Yet even five years after its launch, Al-Arabiya trails far behind Al-Jazeera in terms of audience numbers, with an estimated 23.4 million daily viewers as opposed to Al-Jazeera's 40 million ("Al Arabiya"). Abu Dhabi TV The third biggest Arab satellite news network in terms of audience size, Abu Dhabi TV was first established in 1969 as a state-controlled terrestrial television network. The station was then completely re-launched via satellite in 1998, as part of a media initiative by the Emirate Media Group, a financial group chaired by the son of the President of the United Arab Emirates (Tatham 71). Abu Dhabi TV has flaunted its pan- Arabist nature much more overtly than any of its rivals, for example by running telethons for the Palestinian cause (Tatham 72). The channel's treatment of the United States has been largely on par with that of Al-Arabiya, critical without being ferociously negative (Tatham 73).
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33 Al Manar Like Abu Dhabi TV, Al Manar was first launched in 1991 as a small terrestrial station and later shifted to a 24-hour format and satellite transmission in May 2000. It is an open secret in the region that the bulk of Al-Manar's $15 million yearly budget is supplied by Iran, although the channel is mostly identified as the official mouthpiece of Hezbollah, the Shiite "Party of God" based in Lebanon ("War"). Unsurprisingly given this political affiliation, Al-Manar is the satellite news channel that has placed the most emphasis on the Islamic component of Arab identity, "consistently [insisting on] the indivisibility of Islam and Arabism" through its programming (Rinnawi 17). With a daily audience of 15 million viewers, Al-Manar acquired its regional notoriety by having a dense network of correspondents in the Palestinian territories (Jorisch xv). The station has become strongly identified with the Palestinian cause, going to the extent of carrying the logo of the Palestinian television network for two days after Israeli forces destroyed the Palestinian television facilities in 2001 (Jorisch 29). Since then, Al-Manar has often served "as the first medium through which Palestinian terrorist groups claim responsibility for suicide attacks against Israelis" (Jorisch xiv). Of all of the major satellite news channels, Al-Manar (which translates into "the beacon") is thus the one which most resembles the typical vision of Arab television as a fairly explicit propaganda machine. The channel broadcasts a "steady diet of provocative, horrifying images layered in an impenetrable, univocal discourse of anti-American, anti- Israeli rhetoric" (Lynch, Voices 44).
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34 Al-Manar has broadcast anti-American propaganda since its inception, constantly berating U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, propagating conspiracy theories about the September 11 attacks, and demonizing the relationship between Washington and the "Zionist entity" of Israel" (Jorisch xiv). In one particularly shocking video diffused on the channel, an altered form of the Statue of Liberty is shown with statue's head "transformed into a skull with hollow eyes, her gown dripping in blood, [holding] a sharp knife instead of a torch" (Jorisch 53). In another, names of America's military conflicts over the years are set to images of exploding bombs and bloody corpses, culminating in the slogan "America owes blood to all of humanity"" (Jorisch 53). Broadly speaking, portrayals of the United States on Arab satellite news stations rank from occasionally positive to overbearingly negative, depending on the channel. Hezbollah's Al-Manar television station is thus at the very extreme end of this spectrum, broadcasting a near-constant stream of negative propaganda aimed at flaming anti- American sentiment among its viewers. As with other channels, it is very difficult to isolate the impact of Al-Manar on popular opinion in the region, but it safe to say that while the channel holds sway with its core viewers in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, its influence on the rest of Arab landscape is weak at best. Al-Manar's self- proclaimed association with the Shiite Hezbollah and its indirect links with Iran resonate very poorly with a predominantly Sunni Arab audience (Lynch, Voices 45).
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35 AL-JAZEERA: A CASE STUDY "The president of Yemen, Ali Abd Allah Salih, is reported to have said, "I watch Al-Jazeera more often than the Yemeni TV." (Bahry 93) Most Trusted and Most Watched: Al-Jazeera as the Clear Market Leader There has been no shortage of broad statements on the paradigm-altering impact of Al-Jazeera on the Middle Eastern media scene. Al-Jazeera has been hailed as a "much- needed sounding board for the many contradictions within the Arab world" (Al-Jazeera), transcending news to "become the news itself" (Bahry 97), and reversing the flow of information so that "for the first time in hundreds of years, it passes from East to West" (Hilton). The goal of this case study is thus to explore how Al-Jazeera has risen to such prominence in the regional and even global media landscape in such a short period of time, as well as to understand the nature of the network's coverage of the United States and the reasons behind it. The choice to focus on Al-Jazeera is simply due to the channel's position as the uncontested market leader among Arabic-language satellite news channels. Indeed, the Qatari network has kept its lead in audience numbers even as the market has grown increasingly more competitive (Lynch, Voices 45). For instance, the 2004 Zogby International survey found that Al-Jazeera ranked as the primary news station for a majority of respondents in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. (Lynch, Voices 45). To the question "which TV channel would you tune to first to catch up on current affairs", Al-Jazeera came in well ahead of its competitors, with 40% of total respondents as opposed to 23% for Al-Arabiya, 4% for Al-Manar, and a paltry 2% for the American-funded Al-Hurra (Rheault).
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36 The channel's daily audience is currently estimated at 35 to 45 million viewers within the Arab world, with another 4.5 million in Europe and the United States (Nisbet et al. 19). In fact, the only news network with more viewers in the world today is the national Chinese television (Miles 218)! Perhaps most impressively, some studies have shown Al-Jazeera to be the most popular Arab satellite channel even beyond the category of 24-hour news networks. In a poll of 1300 Palestinians by the Center for Policy and Survey Research, Al-Jazeera was cited as the most watched channel by 47% of respondents, far ahead of generalist and mass entertainment channels such as MBC TV (17%) or Egypt TV (11%), while no other news channels were cited at all. Al-Jazeera's popularity is confirmed by a variety of other metrics, such as the fact that the channel has grown to become one the most recognizable brands in the world. Indeed, between Al-Jazeera Live (a C-SPAN type channel that broadcasts live conferences, government hearings, and the like), Al-Jazeera English, the Aljzeera.net web portal (which is the second most visited Arabic-language web site), and multiple other ventures including individual channels dedicated to sports, business, children's programming and documentaries, the Qatari group is well on its way to becoming a global media corporation ("War"). The network's international growth is reflected in Brandchannel's well-respected annual global survey of consumers, which finds Al-Jazeera to be the most recognized media brand in the world, well ahead of BBC and CNN. In 2006, Al-Jazeera even ranked among the 20 most recognized brands in the world across all categories (Global). Furthermore, when the war in Iraq began in 2003, Internet search engine Lycos
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37 announced that "Al-Jazeera" had become its top search item, with three times more searches than "sex" (Seib 603)! Al-Jazeera's History Al-Jazeera was founded by a royal decree of the Emir of Qatar in February 1996, in the same year that saw the passing of a new Qatari constitution guaranteeing freedom of the press and the closing of Qatar's Ministry of Information, marking a formal end to media censorship by the state (Miles 29). The Emir's new venture benefited from the fortuitous failure of the partnership between Saudi Arabia and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) over the BBC Arabic satellite news station during the exact period when Al-Jazeera was started. The collapse of the BBC Arabic service left "250 BBC-trained journalists and auxiliary staff members out of a job; 120 of whom signed on with Al-Jazeera" (Hilton). The BBC's influence was felt in many aspects of Al-Jazeera (including the newsroom which was modeled on the BBC's in London), and the channel greatly benefited from the audience's early trust of journalists whom they knew had been trained by the venerable British service. As one Al-Jazeera anchor said, "Al-Jazeera was really trusted from the beginning, because we were trained by BBC, we followed BBC guidelines, and we called a spade a spade, Arabs had never seen Arab journalism like this" (Al Haj). Three years after its founding, Al-Jazeera began transmitting in 24-hour format. By 2001, it had an international network of 50 reporters and 35 bureaus in 31 countries, with a far greater presence in the Middle East and Africa than any English-language news network (Maled). As of 2008, the station has nearly 1400 employees worldwide, 450 of whom are journalists (Sahraoui and Zayani 27).
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38 In its ten years of existence, there were two seminal events which established Al- Jazeera as a major actor in the Arab public sphere. The first was the second intifada in Palestine, which introduced Al-Jazeera to Arabic-speaking audiences throughout the Arab world for the first time (Miles 68). The second was Al-Jazeera's post-9/11 coverage and access to the infamous Osama Bin Laden tapes, which introduced the network to the rest of the world (Sullivan). Funding In 1996, the Emir of Qatar gave Al-Jazeera an initial grant of $137 million to start operations, in the hopes that the station would be financially independent within five years (Fandy 47). While the channel's revenue from advertising and the rights to its images has grown tremendously over the years, there is a consensus among media analysts that this income is still far from sufficient to offer the channel full financial autonomy (Fandy 52). Thus the Emir continues to fund the Al-Jazeera group (which includes several other channels apart from the news station), to the tune of some $300 million annually (Miles 63). While Al-Jazeera has sought to present its situation as akin to that of the BBC which receives its funding from the government while preserving a large degree of journalistic freedom, several observers of Middle Eastern media have expressed strong skepticism regarding Al-Jazeera's editorial independence given its dependence on the Emir's largesse (Fandy 9). Interestingly enough, others have argued that Al-Jazeera's funding by the Emir makes the channel significantly more independent than it would be otherwise. This is the position held by Naomi Sakr, who writes that a privatization of the channel "would
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39 expose [it] to the market censorship pressures that often accompany commercialization" ("Challenger" 126). According to this view, the paradox of Al-Jazeera's situation is that its relatively independent editorial approach would be curtailed if the channel were in the private sector (Sakr, "Satellite" 6). The famous Moroccan journalist Aboubakr Jamai, who has run into numerous troubles with the Moroccan authorities over his writings, sums up this paradox deftly: "Al-Jazeera is doing very well in terms of audience, but basically has to be subsidized by the Qatari government because the market is not responding. This is the problem in the Arab world. In a normally functioning market, if you have an audience, normally you find the advertisements to allow you to survive. The problem in the Arab world is, in order to have an audience, you have to be a little bit critical. If you are a little bit critical, then you have problems business-wise" (qtd. in Lang). Al-Jazeera has also suffered from a Saudi-orchestrated boycott by several of the biggest business conglomerates in the Middle East which refuse to advertise on the channel. Indeed, "the way in which the advertising dollar is spent in the Middle East is a political decision, and Qatar's rich Gulf neighbors have used this as a weapon to fight Al- Jazeera" for its critical editorial line (Miles 63). This unofficial boycott has also been joined by the United States, as explained by Al-Jazeera's director Mohammedi Jasam Al Ali in the documentary Al-Jazeera: Voice of Arabia: "Advertising only goes to media which are on good terms with the powers that be. We've always known that to be the case with regard Arab countries. But when this policy is practiced by countries that have taught us the meaning of free speech and an independent media, we find this surprising. We know that of late political pressure has
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40 been put directly or indirectly on American companies so as not to advertise on Al- jazeera." Al-Jazeera's difficulties in getting corporate sponsors are reflected in the amount of airtime given to advertising, since the channel only has about forty to forty-five minutes of advertising per day as compared with roughly three hundred minutes of daily commercial advertising on CNN (Miles 2). Al-Jazeera (and the Arab media in general) is thus in a difficult position: its critical line brings in viewers but scares away advertisers, such that the only option it has left is to accept state funding and hope to be allowed to maintain a critical distance from the government. Paul Starr writes that the "ability of the media to exert a force of their own depend[s] on both their autonomy from state control and their commercial independence" (386), yet the paradox for Arab television channels lies precisely in that fact that they cannot have both of these things at once. Impact of Al-Jazeera's Financial Dependence on the Qatari Emir Mamoun Fandy cynically writes that "the day Al-Jazeera airs a documentary on how the current emir deposed his father will be when we can say that [the channel] is free" (53). While it seems true that Qatari domestic affairs are still largely off-limits to Al-Jazeera, the channel still has a remarkable amount of journalistic freedom for the region. The channel's relative independence from the state was highlighted when the Qatari Foreign Minister even appeared on Bila Hudud (which translates to "Without Limits"), one of Al-Jazeera's talk shows, and was pressed by both the presenter and viewers calling in on contentious topics such as Qatari relations with Israel and the United States (Sakr "Challenger" 120). Moreover, an entire of The Opposite Direction
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41 was specifically dedicated to discuss the merits and drawbacks of hosting an American base in Qatar (Miles 348). Lastly, Al-Jazeera has also hosted jailed Qatari dissidents who accused the government of torture (Miles 60). Overall, the truth is that Qatar is very rarely the topic of Al-Jazeera's programs, yet this seems to stem not from a risk-aversion strategy but simply because Qatar, with a native population of a couple hundred thousand people, is hardly a news priority in the region (Sakr, "Challenger 120). In the context of this thesis, the more important impact of Al-Jazeera's direct dependence on the Emir is the possibility that the Qatari leadership tacitly encourages a certain dose of anti-American programming on the channel. Indeed, one analysis of Al-Jazeera places the channel as part of a delicate balancing game of politics played by Qatar, wherein the Emirate uses Al-Jazeera to pad its Islamic and anti- American credentials even as it hosts the largest American military base in the Middle East (Fandy 48). This is the view espoused by Mohammed El Oifi, who sees the emergence of satellite news channels (and the influence in Arab geopolitics that they confer to their owners) as a strategic choice made by Arab countries seeking to build up their soft power to balance a lack of large armies (hard power) which they cannot have for political or structural reasons ("Processus" 198). In the case of Qatar, the country signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States in June 1992, giving the U.S. base-rights in Qatar in exchange for a guarantee of American protection of the Emirate (Fandy 50). The construction of the Al- Udeid airbase was completed in 1996, and the base served as the main center of operations for the U.S. during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Given the highly negative nature
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42 of Arab public opinion towards the war in Iraq, it seems possible that Qatar has leveraged Al-Jazeera as a forum for anti-American opinions in order to draw attention away from the country's role as the launching pad for the war. I return to Al-Jazeera's treatment of the United States in much greater length in a later section. For now, suffice it to note that Al-Jazeera's funding by the Emir of Qatar has an undeniable impact on the channel's editorial lines. Yet even with these constraints, there is a general consensus that Al-Jazeera is "the nearest the Arab world has to an independent media organization" (Tatham 203). The following sections explore the means by which Al-Jazeera has built up its credibility with its audience, as well as the way in which the network covers the United States. Breaking Taboos and Treating Controversial Topics Al-Jazeera was the first Arab television station to prioritize stories according to their newsworthiness rather than their acceptability to local regimes (Sakr, "Satellite" 6). The channel has not shied away from controversy, running news segments on a wide range of touchy topics such as women's rights, labor rights, or hard-line Wahhabi Islam, which had rarely been discussed on such a public forum until then (Al Haj). The channel's brazen will to cross the red lines of political correctness in the region prompted the sense "Al-Jazeera is the channel of Arab disenchantment, articulating what people want to say but cannot say with a rare sense of audacity" (Sahraoui and Zayani 66). Samir Khader, a senior producer at Al-Jazeera, defended the channel's bold editorial choices in Control Room, a documentary chronicling Al-Jazeera's treatment of the war in Iraq: "Our mission is to educate the Arab masses on democracy, respect of the other's opinion, and free debate [] to try, by using all these things, to shake up these rigid societies, to
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43 awaken them, to tell them "Wake up! Wake Up! There is a war around you, something's happening in the world, you are still sleeping, wake up!" This is the message of Al- Jazeera." Al-Jazeera's news coverage has also heavily irritated heads of state across the Arab world, causing diplomatic riffs between Qatar and nearly all of the governments in the region as well as the U.S. (Al-Jazeera). "You report, we deport" famously became mantra of several Arab nations that closed down Al-Jazeera's local bureaus in retort for what was perceived as injurious commentary on the network's shows (Lamont). In fact, Al-Jazeera's offices were forced to close in so many countries that one popular blogger based in Iraq suggested that the network should change its motto to "Al-Jazeera: The only Arab news network with no offices in the Arab world" (Miles 221). In separate incidents, Kuwait and Jordan both revoked the accreditation of Al- Jazeera's journalists (Miles 49). Saudi Arabia has repeatedly issued virulent criticism of the network through the pan-Arab daily newspapers it controls (Miles 50). In addition, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco all briefly withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar in response to the network's programming (Miles 51). Yet the prize for the most extreme reaction to Al-Jazeera undoubtedly goes to Algeria, which cut electricity to several major cities to prevent people from watching an episode of The Opposite Direction on the Algerian civil war (Miles 59). Beyond the diplomatic rifts that this has created, Al-Jazeera's record of casting an equally critical eye on nearly every government in the region has fostered a genuine sense among viewers that if the channel is upsetting all of these countries, "it must be doing something right" (Control). Viewers also appreciate the difference in tone struck by Al- Jazeera as compared to state-controlled television stations, addressing questions from
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44 multiple perspectives with at least a semblance of objectivity (news pieces are still often biased towards a particular group) rather than spewing the official line of any particular country. The trust and credibility that Al-Jazeera acquired among its growing audience was further consolidated by a plethora of international journalism awards that the channel received (and publicized in self-promoting segments), including one from the world- renowned media-watching French organization "Reporters Sans Frontires" commending Al-Jazeera for its impartial news coverage (Miles 61). Exclusive Reports and Unedited Footage Al-Jazeera's reputation was also built on the channel's obtention of exclusive footage, most famously with tapes from Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, although other examples abound. When the U.S. attacked Iraq in 1998, Al-Jazeera was the only station in the world with a presence on site to film the bombs landing (Blake). During the second Palestinian intifiada in the fall of 2000, Al-Jazeera showed once more that it had the know-how and the know-who to deliver stories better than anyone of its competitors. In a telling sign of how well the channel resonates with-and represents-the so- called "Arab Street", there were instances during the second intifada when the channel's viewers called in spontaneously to give the network leads on breaking news stories. Indeed, in the first days of the intifada the mobile phone number of Al-Jazeera's bureau chief in Ramallah was distributed "on paper and by word of mouth throughout the whole of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, [such that] anybody at all could contact him with news stories-and many did" (Miles 75).
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45 In 2001, Al-Jazeera was also the only network authorized by the Taliban to film the American attacks from within Afghanistan (Al-Jazeera). Similarly, when bombs started hitting Baghdad in March 2003, Al-Jazeera was the only network to maintain a presence in the city as all other international news organizations abandoned the city (Blake). The channel's capacity and willingness to show its audience the concrete impact of American (or American-backed, in the case of Isreal) attacks are one of the main ways in which the channel has helped fan anti-American sentiments in the region. The impact of these images was particularly strong since Al-Jazeera prides itself on showing unedited and often graphic footage of war casualties, including shocking images of civilians but also U.S. soldiers who died in the war. Jihad Ballout, the official spokesman for Al-Jazeera until 2005, famously defended the channel's use of such images, saying that Arab audiences have grown impatient with the edited and censored footage shown on state-controlled television channels and demanded news in which "everything [is] shown to them" (qtd. in Nelson). Progamming The news is clearly the central focus of Al-Jazeera's programming. The channel transmits newscasts every hour on the half hour, with content supplied by the channel's network of correspondents as well as international news agencies (Bahry 91). The other major component of Al-Jazeera's programming is its talk shows. The distinction between Al-Jazeera's newscasts and its talk shows is important since the network's sulfurous reputation with the U.S. as well as other Arab states comes mostly from the content on its talk shows rather than its news programs.
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46 Given the highly negative nature of American reactions to Al-Jazeera, it is quite ironic (and perhaps slightly surprising) that the majority of Al-Jazeera's talk shows are directly modeled after American programs, in what has wittily been dubbed the "Ahmed O'Reilly effect" (after the controversial Fox News anchor Bill O Reilly) (Lynch, qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). For instance, Al Ittijah Al Muakis (which translates to "The Opposite Direction"), one of Al-Jazeera's most popular talk shows, is clearly based on CNN's Crossfire, where guests with opposing opinions are brought together to discuss a controversial political topic ("Arab TV"). Beyond the shouting matches it has become famous for hosting, The Opposite Direction gave credence to Al-Jazeera's aspirations to address and confront taboos in Arab society. The network's other top-ranked talk show, Top Secret, is an investigative monthly news documentary that gained notoriety for attacking highly sensible subjects such as mixed marriages between Palestinians and Israelis or the infiltration of Western intelligence agents in Arab countries ("Al-Jazeera Effect"). For the first time on shows like these, the policies of Arab rulers were criticized and governments were openly denounced as heavily corrupt (Miles 39). It is in this sense that Al-Jazeera has played a certain role in liberating the Arab public sphere. Yet these talk shows were also often platforms for guests with extremely hostile views of the United States (Miles 40). This presents a key point of contention for the channel's claims of objectivity in its treatment of the U.S. Indeed, while Al-Jazeera points to multiple examples of respectful and balanced coverage of the United States on its news broadcasts, the truth remains that the channel has often played host to virulent critics of the U.S. on its talk shows. When confronted with this argument, representatives
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47 for Al-Jazeera retort that the channel is only doing its role as a public broadcaster in bringing on guests who represent the full diversity of Arab perspectives on the United States ("Al-Jazeera Effect"). Al-Jazeera's Portrayal of the U.S. In the words of Alastair Campbell, who served as Director of Communications for former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the complexity of Al-Jazeera's position is that "they report anti-Americanism but deny that anti-Americanism is part of their ethos" (quoted in Sahraoui and Zayani 81). Wadah Khanfar, a managing director at the network, addressed this in saying that while Al-Jazeera's treatment of the U.S. is indeed critical, it is always "respectful" (Khanfar). At any rate, the United States has been the focus of an increasing amount of airtime on Al-Jazeera since the network's launch, from 10.1% of all programs in 1999 to over 26% in 2003 according to a study by Mark Lynch ("Anti" 200). Representatives of the network argue that a significant part of this airtime is spent covering the speeches or presentations of American officials, as echoed by the head of Al-Jazeera's bureau of correspondents: "American leaders appear on our channel more than Arab leaders! It's just bizarre because every time they talk about Al-Jazeera in the media, they say we're Bin Laden's channel! How can that be so when [Americans] are on our channel [so much] more! You see? We get accused whatever we do!" (Control Room) There has indeed been a strong presence of American officials on Al-Jazeera, as the network netted exclusive interviews with senior officials of the Bush administration including Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleeza Rice, or the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("Why"). Nabeel Khoury, a spokesman for the US State Department and one of few native Arabic speakers among high-ranking American officials, says that while Al-
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48 Jazeera has been critical of American foreign policy, it has also been "quite open to us, inviting U.S. government officials to speak directly on their channel and express the American point of view" (Control Room). In a study of 150 talk shows on the channel, all directly themed on the United States, from 1999 to 2005, Mark Lynch found that guests were divided among 2 American officials, 2 American conservatives, 14 Arab pro-American analysts, 25 Arab anti-American analysts who were critical of American policies, and 11 Arab anti- American analysts who were critical of American culture and called for violent resistance against the U.S. ("Anti" 220). There was thus a clear anti-American bias in the distribution of guests invited to participate in the programs. Yet Lynch notes that the most represented view on Al-Jazeera's talk shows by far was political anti-Americanism, criticizing U.S. foreign policy but refraining from "voicing essentialist condemnations of the United States and remain[ing] open to the possibility that American policies might change" ("Anti" 220). Furthermore, after looking closely at "the introductory remarks made by the host [and] the narrative of each program as revealed in the editorially inserted section breaks, " Lynch finds that the discussions were not framed in a fashion specifically conducive to anti-American views being expressed ("Anti" 217). Given that this was the case, it seems fair to assume that anti-American opinions aired on Al-Jazeera's talk shows are more a reflection of popular sentiment among Arabs rather than a product of the channel's editorial policies. Lynch's study also reveals a peak of Anti-American sentiments vehicled on Al- Jazeera's talk shows between early 2002 (after the "Axis of Evil" speech and during the Israeli reoccupation of the West Bank) and spring 2003 (the invasion of Iraq) ("Anti"
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49 218). The increased incidence of anti-American views on Al-Jazeera's talk shows thus seems to be mostly a response to specific policy-related events rather than a general anti- American disposition. One should note here that pro-American guests on Al-Jazeera's programs were noticeably harder to come by after the War in Iraq, reflecting "a policy choice by the Bush administration which stopped sending representatives to appear on the station's programs due to anger over its coverage of Afghanistan" (Lynch, "Anti" 219). U.S. reactions to Arab satellite news networks are explored in greater detail in a later chapter, yet the Bush administration's complete boycott of these channels at one point provides some insight into of how short-sighted and counter-productive the American response to the new Arab media has been thus far. Yet in contrast to the dominance of anti-American rhetoric on its talk shows, a study of Al-Jazeera's newscasts revealed that anti-American pieces were "outliers in relation to the overall charge" of coverage relating to the U.S. ("Anti" 212). In fact, a significant part of Al-Jazeera's coverage of the U.S. concerned American politics and the presidential elections, reflecting a strong Arab interest in American politics. Thus after the terrorist attacks of September 11, Al-Jazeera started a weekly talk show broadcast from Washington D.C. to present its viewers with the American perspective of the events unfolding (Miles 360). In the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections, Al-Jazeera started another weekly show covering the primaries as well as the elections in great detail, explaining "the American electoral process, how delegates are chosen, how the modern primary election system originated, and so on" (Miles 360). The channel also greatly emphasized how close the presidential race was, "cutting against the
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50 urge toward en essentialist view of America, even as Bush's reelection strengthened such views" (Lynch, "Anti" 214). Conclusions on Al-Jazeera Despite its direct funding by the Emir of Qatar, Al-Jazeera enjoys a high level of legitimacy and credibility with its audience. Furthermore, with some forty million daily viewers, it seems that Al-Jazeera can be used as a good indicator of public opinion towards America in the Arab world, although it is also clear that the network's talk shows play a certain role in reinforcing pre-existing anti-American perceptions among viewers. This dynamic is well summarized by Sahraoui and Zayani who write that "Al-Jazeera affects and is affected by Arab public opinion; it listens to the beat of the street and capitalizes on an existing public discourse, giving people what they want while at the same time shaping [what] they want" (66). Yet Al-Jazeera's treatment of the United States should not be summarily dismissed as wholly anti-American. The network's position is perhaps best explained by El-Naway and Iskandar's model for news bias, wherein journalists frame their news with a "contextual objectivity", in a fashion that is "somewhat impartial yet sensitive to local sensibilities" (qtd. in Hahn 21). With employees and viewers from all parts of the Arab world, Al-Jazeera's coverage belies a clear sympathy towards Palestinians (matched with disapproval for U.S. support for Israel), as well as strong disagreement with the American "War on Terror" and the United States' mishandling of the occupation in Iraq (Miles 355). At the same time, the network has also been remarkably open to American points of view, repeatedly inviting U.S. officials to appear on its programs, and Al-Jazeera's heavy
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51 coverage of the American presidential elections belies a strong interest in American politics despite opposition towards American foreign policy. SALIENT FEATURES OF SATELLITE TV NEWS CHANNELS After the identifying and describing the main news actors in the Arab satellite TV space, I now turn to a discussion of the most salient features and important changes brought on by these networks as opposed to state-run television stations, especially with regards to news coverage of the United States. Arab Satellite News Channels as the Dominant Source of News for Arab Populations Yet before exploring the factors that have driven the growth of Arab satellite news channels, it is important to note that these networks have largely replaced terrestrial (state-controlled) channels as the main source of news for populations across the Middle East. For instance, according to a 2007 Gallup poll of 1006 adults in Saudi Arabia, 93% of respondents cited Arab satellite news channels as their most trusted source of information, well ahead of newspapers (68%), national television (59%), international radio (47%), and the internet (43%) (Rheault). According to another poll held in Egypt and the UAE, 56% of respondents preferred to watch Al-Jazeera compared to 10% for the countries' national television stations (Gockel and Kraig 15). Additional poll results demonstrate that satellite news channels are also trusted significantly more than national television stations. Thus in a May 2006 BBC/Reuters poll specifically centered on the question of trust in the media, Al-Jazeera was mentioned spontaneously by urban Egyptians as being significantly more trustworthy than their national media, in the following proportions: 59% trusted Al-Jazeera, followed by 12% for Channel 1 Egypt TV, and only 6% for Al Ahran, one of the most prominent Egyptian
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52 newspapers ("BBC"). Other surveys have yielded similar results, all highlighting the primacy of Arab satellite news channels as the premier and most trusted source of news in the Middle East today. Increasing Freedom of Thought and Enlarging Spheres of Debate The emergence of satellite television channels marked the first instance of a news source that Arab governments could not easily censor. Since satellite transmission transcends borders, there is simply no way to stop these channels' signals from being received in each country, offering local populations and confronting Arab leaders with an un-filterable and un-editable source of information. Any attempts to restrict this new media are counter-productive, since "the shutdown itself sends a message" and is immediately picked up on by other news networks, generating negative press for the country and likely amplifying coverage of the issue that authorities were originally attempting to stop (Gockel and Kraig 7). Thus it is no longer feasible for Arab regimes to "muzzle information as a tool for political control and manipulation, [and] the Arab citizen is no longer convinced by old propaganda methods" (United 85). Arab satellite television news channels have thus clearly contributed to a revival of criticism and dialogue in the Arab media (United 85), if only by creating a real choice of news sources for the first time in the region. As Mark Lynch writes, "where only a decade ago the typical Arabic-speaking media consumer would have struggled mightily to find serious differences of political opinion on television, by 2003 she would be relentlessly bombarded with political arguments across the satellite television dial" (Voices 8). The emergence of satellite news channels has thus given Arab audiences access to a large array of political opinions, from "pro-American "moderates" on the
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53 Saudi-owned al-Arabiya to radical anti-American Islamists on the [Hezbollah-affiliated] Al-Manar, and all points in between" (Lynch, Voices 5). Moreover, these channels are providing not only news but also political commentary and analysis to helps people make sense of the news (Hammami and Tamari). Mohammed El Oifi even uses the term "Al-Jazeera effect" to describe Arab satellite news channels' seminal role in allowing a greater circulation of information between Arab countries and creating a forum for voices of contestation to be heard ("Processus" 199). Talal Al Haj, the former Washington bureau chief for Al-Jazeera, echoes this idea, saying that satellite news channels have given a platform to "opposition leaders and people of thought who had previously been kept away from discussing their opinion in the open" (Al Haj). Satellite channels have thus played a central role in laying the foundation of pluralistic debate in the Arab world and instilling the beginnings of "a culture of accountability in the Arab world" ("Arabic"), making it "legitimate for people to disagree about topics of the day and still be authentic Arabs, [while also] making it very difficult for Arab regimes to regain full control of political discourse" (Lynch, qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). What is more, there is some reason to believe that the emergence of a freer media and a more open public sphere in the Arab world has contributed to a certain change in mentalities in the region, with people placing significantly greater importance on their freedom of thought than they did in the past. In the 2003 United Nations Freedom Survey conducted on representative samples of the population from 5 Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine), close to 95% of respondents cited "Freedom of thought" and "freedom of opinion and expression" as the most important elements
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54 making up their conceptions of freedom (United 98). This represents a 5% increase as compared with UN survey results from 1998, before the massive penetration of satellite dish ownership in the region (United 102). While it is clearly impossible to establish causation between the emergence of satellite news channels and this change in Arabs' conceptions freedom, it is nonetheless interesting to note that a correlation that exists. Programming Unlike state-controlled terrestrial stations which traditionally imposed on their viewers what they had to watch, satellite channels operate in an increasingly competitive market where they essentially show viewers what they want to watch (Kilani 22). Mark Lynch expresses a similar idea, writing that "Al-Jazeera rose to prominence by giving voice to public opinion rather than directly attempting to mobilize or lead it" (Voices 37). In this sense, Arab satellite news channels have given the Arab publics something much closer to what mass media organs are supposed to be according to classical media theory, as "intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to public concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and viewpoints" (Klaehn 1). Yet while they do not tell people what to think, Arab satellite news channels still serve an "agenda-setting function", strongly affecting what people think about (Starr 398). This idea is highlighted in a study on how Arab satellite news stations covered the Palestinian presidential election in 2005. Indeed, the researchers find that news channels' editorial choices, especially with regards to the allocation of airtime to certain political factions over others, signaled the a new era in which "media actors [have become] autonomous public players competing with the political sphere to set priorities, represent
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55 groups, mirror and lead public opinion, and in many cases, to mobilize the public on a number of issues" (Maiola and Ward 116). Arab satellite news channels are thus increasingly constructing the "dominant narrative frames through which people [across the Arab world] understand events" (Tessler, "Arab"176). More specifically, the dominant narrative established by Arab satellite news channels is based on a distinct pan- Arab identity. Indeed, the transnational nature of these satellite television stations means that for the first time all populations across the Middle East can tune in to the same networks for news. This has greatly reduced the sense of distance between people in the Middle East and created a region-wide narrative in which everything that takes place is part of the same storyline. In this way, "Palestine, Iraq, democracy reform, and elections [are all] part of the same storylines" (Lynch, qtd. in "Al-Jazeera"). Mark Lynch further points out that "the near-universal exposure to this new public sphere is what gives it such a transformative impact [] Throughout every Arab country, and extending through a widespread diaspora, Arab viewers consider themselves part of a single, common, ongoing political argument" (Voices 35). The implications of this tendency of Arab satellite news channels to cater to a pan-Arab narrative are explored at length in the next section. Treating the News from an Arab Perspective Mohammedi Jasam Al Ali, Al-Jazeera's director, said clearly of his network that "we are an Arab network whose primary interest is Arab news, and even if we cover world events, we do so from an Arab standpoint" (qtd. in Al-Jazeera). The idea that Arab satellite news channels contribute to shape "a pan-Arab public opinion" (Bouchard 36) is
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56 thus clearly embraced by these channels, whose employees often take pride in their presentation of the news from an Arab point of view. More broadly, Al-Jazeera and its competitors portray events "very much from a very self-conscious Arab standpoint, openly identifying with Palestinians or Iraqis under sanctions" (Lynch, qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). For example, during the controversy surrounding the caricatures of the prophet, "the majority of Arab news anchors referring to the controversy used phrases such as al- nabi-al-karim ("the Dear prophet") or added "peace be upon him" after the prophet's name" (Hahn 21). Also, in referring to Palestinian suicide bombers or victims of Israeli raids, most Arab anchors use the Arabic world shahid, deriving from a verb meaning "to witness" but which also carries a connotation of martyrdom (Hahn 21). These networks' adoption of an Arab perspective has also meant rejecting the American frame for events, for example by refusing to call the Iraqi resistance to American troops "enemies" or "terrorists" (Lynch, Voices 48). Indeed, Arab satellite news channels have been "alone in proceeding from the premise that [the War in Iraq] should be viewed as an illegal enterprise, [and have chosen to] broadcast the horror [of] the blown-out brains, the blood-spattered pavements, screaming infants, and corpses", presenting a distinct corrective frame to American networks' presentation of events (Seib 602). Samar Jarrah, a former reporter for Jordan Television summarizes this difference, saying that while "CNN, CBS, ABC, showed how the rockets launched, Al-Jazeera showed where the rockets landed" (qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). The difference between Arab and American coverage is thus the result of differences in bias but more importantly
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57 of coverage coming from two very different viewpoints, "that of the invader and that of the invaded" (Lynch, Voices 50). Samir Khader, a senior producer at Al-Jazeera, defends this editorial choice, saying "we want to show that the war has a human cost because we care for the Iraqi people, we are Arabs like them, and we are Muslims like them" (qtd. in Control Room). More broadly, Abderrahim Foukara, the UN bureau Chief for Al-Jazeera says that Arab satellite news channels "cater to an Arab sensibility" in a way that clearly reflects in both the tone and content of their programming (qtd. in "Al-Jazeera Effect"). Arab satellite news stations have thus co-opted the "Arab voice" and unilaterally decided to champion the cause of Arab peoples against corrupt Arab regimes but also against American aggression. According to Mark Lynch, "this is a claim to authenticity, to identity, and ultimately to a very real political power" (Voices 25). The actors in this new media have thus established a strong cultural hegemony over the Middle East public landscape, "primarily by establishing an [Arab] framework for the news" (Klaehn 2). Moreover, the narrative established by these channels has also played a central role in defining a new pan-Arab identity, bringing Arabs together in "real time and in a common language alongside intense images and a shared political discourse [where] Arab and Islamic identities serve as a reference point" (Lynch, Voices 4). It should be noted here that the Middle East lends itself particularly well to the creation of such a shared narrative, given the existence of a historic Arab basin with a linguistic, religious and cultural cohesion running throughout it (Gonzalez-Quijano 176). The religious dimension merits particular attention in this discussion, since the concept of the united
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58 Islamic Ummah (or "nation") resonates with strength in a part of the world that was united under Muslim caliphates for a very long time. The Arabic language even has a word, "qawmiya", which specifically designs the idea of a common Arab nationality, and which is itself based the older concept of "asabiya" or "blood solidarity" (Tatham 23). A "vague and amorphous feeling that Arabs are one people" is thus a strong part of the Arab consciousness (Patai 220). Historically speaking, the most important period for the birth and articulation of this identity is undoubtedly Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabist movement that took place while he was the President of Egypt, in the 1960s. After coercing the French and the British into accepting his nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser became a real hero for Arab people across the Middle East, and he spent the following decade trying to spread his vision of Arab unity and Arab socialism as "the panacea for the ills of the Arab world and the rejuvenation of Arab power" (Susser). Yet after Nasser's death, pan-Arabism "was left to drift for decades without meaningful state sponsorship, supporting economic structures and few civil society institutions to develop its ideas despite its strong evocative nature in the Arab world" (Rinnawi 15). The movement's fall was precipitated by individual leaders in each country who sought to strengthen their respective spheres of influence. As Asher Susser writes, "the great promise [of Arab unity and greatness] proved to be no more than an illusion". The geo-political reality of the Middle East today, with a motley assortment of states, many of which have ongoing disputes, makes it all but impossible for the Arab world to ever unite under a single authority. Yet there remains a consciousness that "on some elevated plane, if not in everyday reality, all Arabs are one" (Tatham 23). The
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59 continued potency of the pan-Arab ideal among people in the Middle East is illustrated by Arab leaders' continued treatment of pan-Arabism as a threat to their power. This is evidenced in their repeated attempts to censor or otherwise prevent satellite news channels from "harnessing the potential of linguistic and cultural unity to launch a media renaissance" (United 85). In a recent example, the Arab league passed a new media charter in February 2008, which increased government control over satellite news stations by limiting free political expression on the airwaves. In an op-ed piece for the International Herald Tribune, Mohamed Elmenshawy, a renowned analyst of Arab media, denounces the new code for allowing governments to take "necessary legislative measures to deal with [any eventual] violations" by satellite channels, including the right to confiscate broadcasting equipment and withdraw broadcasting authorization. The charter was approved by 20 out of 22 countries in the Arab league, with Lebanon voting against it and Qatar abstaining. Yet despite the best efforts of Arab governments, the idea of Arab nationalism never completely disappeared from the Arab collective, and at the very least, the remnants of the dream for Arab unity proved fertile enough for satellite news channels to seize and build on them when they emerged in the late 1990s (Susser). By addressing their viewers as if they were all part of the same community, these networks have thus been able to reignite a sense of "perceived connectedness" among their audiences (Nisbet et al. 16), bringing viewers together in what the sociologist Benedict Anderson called an "'imagined community" (5).
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60 Anderson postulated that a community "is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (5). Ties within this community are thus "imagined as indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship" (Anderson 5) across a deep, horizontal comradeship regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in specific regions (Anderson 7). Moreover, the news constitutes a primary force in the construction and maintenance of "this fictive social entity" by reporting on the "will" of the people and giving the impression of a "unified social body of people who have similar beliefs" (Husting 3). Anderson also stresses the need for imagined communities to be periodically re-imagined (8), which Arab satellite news channels do by airing programming aimed at rehabilitating Arab history and contextualizing it into a modern Arabo-Islamic context (Rinnawi 8). A strong parallel can be drawn here with media in the Soviet Union after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Writing on this topic in the Yale Law Journal, Monroe E. Price writes that television channels in Eastern Europe focused on "standard elements to chronicles of identity [such as] histories of origins, of blessedness, of chosenness, of victimness, and of redemption [to] provide new tropes of legitimacy" to the Soviet identity (681). Al-Jazeera and its peers have fostered a "re-imagination of Arab and Islamic communities" in a very similar fashion (Rinnawi 154).
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61 McArabism In his book Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera and Transnational Media in the Arab World, Khalil Rinnawi coins the term "McArabism" to describe this re- imagined pan-Arab identity. Describing the effect of satellite news channels, Rinnawi writes that they have created a context "in which citizens throughout the Arab world receive identical nationalist pan-Arab content via transnational media, just as one can get the same Big Mac at any McDonald's outlet" (xiii). According to Rinnawi, this new pan- Arabism is characterized by shared feelings of identity as well as united stances on central crises affecting the region: the Palestinian issue, the Iraqi crisis, and to a slightly lesser extent, economic and political inequalities in the region, and a more prominent role of Islam in society (Rinnawi 16). Equally importantly, "McArabism often works in antagonism to the state, enjoins upon Arab audiences to critically think and respond to events around them-a radical drift from Arab leader-follower models" (Rinnawi 19). Weakening national allegiances are thus a central corollary of the new pan-Arab identity, with the state gradually giving gives way to "Arabness" as the principal point of reference for political identification across the region (El Oifi, "Processus" 202) The increasing interaction of Arabs with non-Arab cultures and "the manner in which they are treated by those cultures which see them as Arabs rather than as holders of specific nationalities prompts Syrians, Moroccans, Iraqis, Saudis and other Arabs to embrace a heightened Arab identity vis vis the outside world" (Rinnawi 154). The thesis of a strong Arab rather than national identity is partially supported by results from
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62 a 2002 Zogby poll in which ""being Arab" proved to be the most frequently cited source of identity" in seven of the eight countries covered in the study (Zogby, What 50). Anti-Americanism as a Central Part of Pan-Arabism After laying out an explanatory framework and background for the new pan-Arab identity that is being fueled by Arab satellite news channels, it is important to highlight that pan-Arabism (in both its historic and more recent incarnations) is inextricably linked with a certain dose of anti-Americanism. Indeed, Raphael Patai writes that the Arab psyche is indelibly marked by the notion that the U.S. "had, and still has, selfish and sinister aims in its dealing with the Arabs" (310). Similarly, Mark Lynch writes that "Arab public discourse is dominated by a well-entrenched narrative identifying America as generally hostile, aggressive, and untrustworthy [] It is grounded in historical memories of specific U.S. policies and fueled by ongoing grievances with those policies" ("anti" 197). The emergence of a common Arab narrative linking events throughout the Arab world thus focuses naturally on a certain dislike of the United States as a common denominator in otherwise tenuously related countries and issues (Lynch, "anti" 206). In this context, Arab satellite news stations allowed Arabs to experience American presence in the region more viscerally and intensely than ever before, "while uniting the disparate politics of local anti- Americanisms into a single, overarching anti-American frame" (Lynch, "anti" 201). After establishing in Chapter 1 that Arab satellite news stations have a certain reinforcing effect on their viewers' pre-existing anti-American dispositions, it is now possible to point to satellite news stations' appeal to a pan-Arab dialectic which is inherently anti-American as the mechanism by which this reinforcement takes place. The
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63 following sections explore the concrete means by which this pan-Arab appeal is achieved as well as the reasons behind satellite news stations' decision to market themselves to a pan-Arab audience. Use of Standard Modern Arabic The first way in which Arab satellite news channels have fostered a renewed sense of pan-Arabism among their audiences is one so obvious it may seem futile to point out: the use of the Arabic language. Yet the use of a modern standard form of Arabic was a central part of these networks' early success among Middle Eastern audiences. For instance, while anchors' pronunciation may seem somewhat inconsequential in how viewers judge news sources, Sa'eda Kilani notes that the emergence of Arab satellite channels marked the first time that Arab viewers could tune into credible and professional-caliber news where anchors pronounced Arabic names correctly: "no more Baagdaad instead of Baghdad; no more Nazeriyeh instead of Al-Nassiriyyah which American and international media find so hard to spell correctly" (Kilani 202). Yet beyond correct pronunciation, these channels' use of Arabic is key since the language is arguably "the most potent factor in both the creation and the maintenance of [the] myth of Arab nation, Arab unity, and Arab brotherhood [] it is the essence of the Arab ethos" (Patai 44). This focal importance of Arabic is also due to the fact that it is the language in which the Koran was originally delivered. What is more, written Arabic has remained largely unchanged over time, so there is a strong sense of pride and a very real link between the language and the historic past of Arab society and culture (Rugh 19). Lastly, there is an intrinsic complexity and beauty in the Arabic language which is a source of great pride to Arabic-speakers (Rugh 19).
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64 Raphael Patai even writes that "if an Arab were asked to choose a single dividing line between the ingroup of which he feels a part and the outgroup consisting of the alien world, he would in all probability point to the circle within which are found Arabic speakers, and outside which are the speakers of all other tongues whatever their religious persuasion" (45). The Arabic language thus carries a significant power to "maintain a mythical sense of unity among [people from all] Arab states" (Patai 48), such that the use of Arabic on satellite news channels carries a significant "participatory importance" in the viewing experience they provide (Rinnawi 9). 24-Hour News Format In addition to the use of the Arabic language, Arab satellite news channels have also fostered a new sense of pan-Arabism among Middle Eastern by presenting them with an unprecedented availability of news. Before the emergence of satellite channels in the Arab world, television news was typically limited to two or three 30-minute newscasts per day. Aside from the dryness of the content that was shown on these newscasts, the limited availability of any news images on television limited the extent to which people could feel engaged with current events. In contrast, satellite channels ushered in an era of on-demand news available any and every hour of the day. Beyond the practicality that this offered viewers who could now get their "news fix" at any time they pleased, this also meant that people could be drawn into the news for much longer periods of time. "Rather than watch once each day, people began to follow events hour by hour, " (Miles 190) and televisions were left in the background of shops, cafs and homes as people went about their daily tasks. According to the Allied Media Corporation, a market research firm that specializes in Arab media, Al-Jazeera viewers spend an average of 3
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65 hours a day watching the channel ("Al-Jazeera TV"). Similarly, in a two-week survey of 5300 visitors to Al-Jazeera.net website, some 60% of respondents claim that they had their television tuned to Al-Jazeera over two hours per day, either actively viewing or leaving the channel on in the background while attending to other tasks (Al-Jaber et al). The 24-hour programming of satellite channels thus presents significantly more windows of opportunity for people to tune in and be a part of the "imagined community" (Rinnawi 21). In addition, the diffusion of live programming reinforces the "imagined community" by creating a sense of immediacy to the communal experience, as viewers know that they and millions of others are watching events as they unfold (Rinnnawi 20). This was particularly salient during Al-Jazeera's live coverage in the very beginning of the second Palestinian intifada or wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, "as the Arab public followed the events hour by hour" (Miles 68). Furthermore, the 24-hour format of these channels, with a constant diffusion and repetition of emotion-conjuring footage, drastically "increases the power of images to [reinforce] the imagined community shared [by] viewers. Like the incessant replays of the attack on the World Trade Center in the United States, footage showing the sieges of Jenin and Behtlehem [in Palestine] is imprinted on viewers' minds and elicits [anger] against those who would do such things" (Ttrault 37). The 24-hour format combined with the use of sensationalist or particularly emotive footage is thus one of the central ways in which Arab satellite news channels contribute to reinforcing anti-American views held by their audience. The constant diffusion of images showing Iraqi casualties or Palestinian suffering at the hands of an American-backed Israel "impress upon [viewers] recurrent feelings of helplessness and
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66 betrayal at the hands of the U.S." (Miles 388) and conjure up strong feelings of identification and engagement among viewers (Rinnawi 22). News That Draws on Arabo-Islamic History and Focuses on Shared Pan-Arab Concerns Arab satellite news channels also contribute to creating a strong pan-Arab identity among their audiences through a heavy dose of programs and documentaries on Middle Eastern history which "encourage viewers to engage in symbolic events [and] milestones of Arabo-Islamic culture, [and] to recreate [their] worldview based on an ethnic and religious identity" (Rinnawi 21). For instance, one way in which Al-Jazeera played up the sensibility of its audience to Middle Eastern history during the war in Iraq was by ending every newscast with live images of Baghdad: "Coverage would cut to a camera overlooking the city, all commentary would cease and the tagline "Baghdad is burning" would appear on the screen. [] Showing Baghdad like this, to underline that the city itself was a casualty of war, was a hugely powerful emotional statement. Baghdad was one of the great historic centers of the Muslim world until it was ransacked by the Mongol hordes, and now it was being attacked again, this time by an American-led coalition. No commentary was necessary and the symbolism ran deep for Arab viewers" (Miles 242). Beyond symbolic imagery, Arab satellite news channels' heavy coverage of the war in Iraq belies another method by which these networks federate viewers around a pan-Arab identity, namely by focusing on political crises between Arab and non-Arab states as opposed to local issues pertaining to each country (Rinnawi 21). This is confirmed by a study of five major Arab satellite channels (Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Jazeera, Lebanese Television, MBC, and Syrian Satellite Television) which found that all the
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67 networks carry a majority of news items focused on political pan-Arab questions, to the effect of 72.3% of programs for Al-Jazeera (Rinnawi 109). In a telling moment captured in the documentary film Control Room on Al- Jazeera's treatment of the news, a journalist and his editor are discussing the line-up for the day's newscast when the journalist asks "What about the first Round of French elections?" The editor's reply, "No, let's stick with Palestine", is indicative of the type of conscious choice made daily by Arab satellite channels to focus on issues of pan-Arab concern. Beyond its contribution to the sentiment of a pan-Arab identity among their viewers, the dominance of regional as opposed to local news stories on Arab satellite television is central in understanding how these news networks reinforce anti- Americanism in the region. Indeed, one of the main corollaries of this focus of Arab news channels is that "if you're telling a region-wide story, the United States is necessarily going to play a more central role than it would in any individual country's storyline" (Fandy 65). The centrality of issues of pan-Arab concerns on Arab satellite news networks, especially the war in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, is thus a large part of these channels' reinforcing effect on their viewers' anti-American sentiments. Audience Participation In one of the most famous instances of audience participation on Arab satellite television programs, one and a half million Jordanians voted to support a Jordanian contestant on a reality television program designed to discover the next Arab star singer. The voter turnout to elect the winner of a reality television show in Jordan thus exceeded any turnout ever recorded for parliamentary elections held in the country (Kilani 24).
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68 Although this episode did not take place on a news channel, it illustrates the importance of audience participation on Arab satellite television as a whole. As Khalil Rinnawi explains, in the Arab world watching satellite TV has become a "participatory activity" (xvii), and viewers' contribution to the programming they watch arguably enhances their engagement with the rest of the "imagined community". Indeed, the potential to contribute to an ongoing dialogue binds people together through the programming in a special way, giving viewers the sentiment that "they are all building and extending an on-air community together" (Herbst 12). Thus on Al-Jazeera's talk shows, viewers are invited to call in and express their opinions on the topic at hand. People in the hundreds and thousands "storm [the] programs, emailing, faxing, and waiting on international phone lines [despite the egregious prices of international communications in many Middle Eastern countries] for a long time just to pour their opinions on a certain subject" (Kilani 9). In a culture where media censorship used to be the norm, it is important to note that these viewer call-ins are aired live and are rarely if ever cut off or otherwise edited by the stations (Miles 37). The opportunity for viewers to participate in programs and voice their opinions is particularly valued in a part of the world where people were previously accustomed to an authoritative top-down process of opinion-formation that left very little room for individual expression. By allowing audience participation, Arab satellite news channels thus gave voice to an Arab public which had been largely deprived of one.
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69 Viewer participation therefore also contributes to the sense of pan-Arabism, since it directly shows people that they are part of a diverse audience stretching across the Middle East. In the course of a single talk show, "you can see Iraqis, Palestinians, Saudis, Jordanians, Moroccans, and Arab residents in foreign countries all project their views on the same subject" (Kilani 23). Moreover, audience call-ins confer believability to the notion that it is public opinion that shapes this new medium and not the opposite (Lynch, Voices 54). Lastly, it is important to note that audience calls on political talk shows are often from viewers with strong anti-American views. Thus while the newscasts on Arab satellite news channels are not overtly anti-American, the opinions aired on these networks' talk shows often are. Diversity of staff Another characteristic of Arab satellite news channels which helps them appeal to and solidify a pan-Arab identity among their viewers is the fact that the staffs of these channels come from all corners of the Middle East. Employees of these stations represent almost all 22 members of the Arab league, with "Moroccan producers, Syrian talk show hosts, Iraqi translators, Algerian fixers, Sudanese librarians, Palestinian secretaries, and Qatari executives, all speaking together in Arabic" (Zednik). This diversity is especially important as it extends to anchors and talk show hosts who appear on screen, serving as a concrete visual illustration of pan-Arab unity for viewers.
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70 Reasons Behind Satellite News Channel's Focus on Garnering pan-Arab Appeal While the above sections delve into the means by which Arab satellite news channels shape their programming to both shape and appeal to a strong pan-Arab identity among their viewers, the reasons for this choice have yet to be explored. The first factor of explanation for these channels' decision to gear themselves towards a pan-Arab audience is an economic one based on market share. Thus, Mohammedi El Oifi writes that the reason for Arab satellite news channels' pan-Arab targeting is that the national populations in the Gulf countries where these networks are based are too small to constitute a critical mass of viewers ("Processus" 194). While the individual audiences possible in each Arab country are small, the collective population of the entire region is sizable. The incentive to reach out to a regional rather than local audience is thus driven by a competitive drive for the largest possible viewership (Lynch, Voices 24). The focus on issues of pan-Arab concerns (which are inextricably linked to a certain political anti-Americanism, as seen above) is then simply the best economic course of action for Arab satellite news channels seeking to capture the widest possible audience. Mohammed Ayish goes further in arguing that garnering pan-Arab appeal was the only solution for Arab media to survive in an increasingly globalized media context. In a time when national agendas were being increasingly inspired by external events, Ayish argues that the survival of Arab media depended on drawing "on the concept of pan-Arab integration in political, economic, and cultural spheres [so as to adopt the] role of preservers and perpetuators of Arab cultural values" ("Changing" 130).
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71 Yet beyond the pan-Arab appeal of Arab satellite news channels, it is worth delving more specifically into these networks' heavy coverage of Palestine and Iraq (which tend to reinforce viewers' discontent with American foreign policy). Mamoun Fandy advances several arguments to explain the centrality of the Palestinian and Iraqi questions in pan-Arab media coverage. Of these, the most salient by far is that covering Palestine and Iraq is a "safe bet" for journalists, allowing them to "show their talent for vilifying the occupying force in eloquent Arabic with very little political cost" (Fandy 85). As compared with criticism of local regimes, stories focusing on political questions of pan-Arab concern, especially those relating to the failures of American foreign policy in the region, are thus preferred because they are considered safe (Gockel and Kraig 6). As Fandy writes, "any Arab journalist who spends 15 or 20 minutes on the air blasting America or Israel is not likely to be met with anger from the audience or government [] Rather he knows that he will be praised by both" (89). Put simply, the political cost of covering Palestine or Iraq (with the effect of reinforcing anti-American sentiments among viewers) is nil from the perspective of an Arab journalist (Fandy 90). Conclusions The end of the 1990s saw the emergence of several Arabic-language satellite news channels that directly and powerfully interpreted political events through the lens of a pan-Arab identity and an Arabo-Islamic cultural referent (El Oifi, "Processus" 194). By focusing on questions of interest to all Arabs, vocalizing Arab positions on regional issues, using strongly graphic footage, and perhaps most importantly, by not emphasizing the comings and goings of a single leader but rather the shortcomings of all regional
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72 leaders and of American foreign policy in the region, these channels garnered significant popular support and rapidly became the preferred source of news across the Middle East. This new media contrasted sharply with the "dominant paradigm of traditional government-controlled" television stations (Nisbet et al. 18). Through their programming and their adoption of a distinct pan-Arab point of view, Arab satellite news channels successfully federated their viewers into an "imagined community" based on shared pan- Arab concerns, chief of which is a strong disapproval of American foreign policy in the region. The following chapters explore the implications of these satellite channels' effect on their viewers' perceptions of the United States. I then provide an assessment of the American response to this new media so far, as well as some policy conclusions regarding the necessary steps to establish a better working rapport between the United States and these networks.
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73 CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF REINFORCED ANTI-AMERICANISM ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST This thesis is centered on the aggravating effect of Arab satellite news channels on anti-American sentiments in the Middle East. Yet if one considers Arab anti- Americanism and the influence of Arab media from the strictly pragmatic standpoint of realpolitik, it is legitimate to ask "so what?!" Why should the U.S. care if people in the Middle East dislike or disagree with American foreign policy, so long as their governments are American allies? Several experts of international relations have echoed such views in more diplomatic terms. For instance Robert Keohane notes that there is no correlation whatsoever between Arab countries where public opinion is predominantly anti-American and those which have not cooperated with the U.S. in the war on terror, the idea being that governments do not often act on negative perceptions of the U.S. by their populations (Anti-Americanism). Yet in this section, I advance several arguments detailing how the reinforced anti- Americanism provoked by Arab satellite news channels across the Middle East affects the region in ways that directly concern the United States. A New Arab Public The first point to make in this discussion is that Arab satellite news channels have greatly contributed to making Arab public opinion well-informed and highly interested in regional politics (Bouchard 31). These stations have provided their viewers with constant exposure to the high amount of dramatic political events and conflicts in the region over the past ten years. This in turn has created a high degree of politicization among Arab
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74 viewers who have come to "consider political education and engagement as essential parts of their lives" (Ayish, "Political" 150). In addition to creating a deep sense of consciousness among viewers of the centrality of politics in the Middle East, Arab satellite news channels have also democratized access to news, such that a "lack of education and functional illiteracy are no longer big obstacles to learning about politics" (Prior 267). These networks thus provided less educated citizens with more basic information, which increased their political knowledge but also their likelihood of going to the polls (Prior 256). The Prospect of Democratically Elected Anti-American Governments The democratization of access to news, the increased politicization of audiences, and the reinforcement of anti-American views provoked by Arab satellite news stations thus combine to present a first point of interest in this discussion. Namely, this new political consciousness among Arab populations (who are in strong disagreement with U.S. foreign policy) means a greater likelihood of them going to the polls, posing a true paradox for the U.S. On one hand, the American vision for the Middle East calls for an increase in democratic practices across the region. On the other, if free elections are held in these countries, they are increasingly likely to yield governments that reflect popular discontent with American foreign policy and are thus unfriendly to the U.S. The results of recent elections in several countries give strong credence to this theory. In Saudi Arabia, municipal elections saw the victory of a group of Islamists close to Al-Qaeda. In Egypt, the socially conservative and strongly anti-American Muslim Brotherhood was able to get 88 representatives elected to parliament (Shefa). Election results in Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, and Morocco point to similar significant gains
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75 by groups with a hard line against the United States. As always, it is difficult to establish a link of causation between Arab satellite news channels and these electoral results, especially since votes for groups at the extreme end of the political spectrum are used by people to signify their dissatisfaction with current regimes. Still, the prominence of satellite news channels as people's preferred source of information in the region, combined with these channels' critical stances on American foreign policy, are likely contributing in some capacity to higher scores for political factions with clear anti- American stances when free elections are held. The first reason for which the impact of Arab satellite news channels should matter to the United States is thus that these networks heighten their audience's political engagement and likely contribute to victories by anti-U.S. political groups when free elections are held, highlighting the risks of a "brutal promotion of democracy" in the region (Bouchard 41). A Cold Reception for American Initiatives in the Middle East Arab satellite news stations also have an indirect adverse effect on U.S. efforts for democracy promotion in the Arab world. As was previously discussed, Arab satellite news channels' focus on framing a pan-Arab narrative yields a heavy focus on the failures of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Middle East. This in turn reinforces anti- American sentiments among viewers, which then takes away a lot of the credibility for American democracy-promotion efforts in the region. Thus, by highlighting the damage inflicted by the U.S. on Iraq and the negative consequences of U.S. support for Israel, satellite news coverage makes American democracy promotion efforts seem like hypocritical initiatives.
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76 This climate also makes it impossible for pro-democracy groups to collaborate with the U.S, as was seen with the popular Egyptian democratic movement Kefaya, whose activists "vocally rejected any U.S. assistance, both because any association with the United States would discredit the movement in Egyptian eyes and because of opposition to U.S. foreign policies" (Lynch, "anti" 208). More broadly, Mark Lynch writes that "anti-American dispositions can shape the political arena in ways that make some political outcomes less likely, " as is the case when U.S. democratic reform proposals, "which roughly accord with what majorities of Arabs say they want, are met with fierce opposition" ("anti" 199). The reinforced anti-Americanism brought on by Arab satellite news channels thus runs counter to U.S. efforts for democracy-promotion. This was most recently seen in the poor reception given to the U.S. "Greater Middle East Initiative", which called to reshape the region "through economic and social reforms [] promoting democracy and good governance, the establishment of a knowledge society, and the enhancement of economic opportunities" (United 29). Despite several potentially valid reform ideas, the program was "widely shunned not only by authoritarian Arab leaders but also by the Arab civil society reformers who would presumably most benefit from it" (Lynch, "Losing"). By augmenting Arab populations' awareness and knowledge of the U.S. role in Iraq and Palestine, Arab satellite news channels make U.S. efforts for democracy promotion in the Arab world seem like hypocritical initiatives and thus drastically decrease their odds of success.
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77 Affecting Arab Leaders' Relations with the U.S. Arab satellite news channels have also brought on a much closer scrutiny of Arab leaders' interactions with the American government. Marc Lynch writes that the "new Arab public" that gets its news from Arab satellite TV "rejects the long, dismal traditions of enforced public consensus, insisting on the legitimacy of challenging official policies and proclamations [and forcing] Arab leaders to justify their positions far more than ever" (Voices 3). In essence, Arab satellite news channels have played a central role in introducing a "new level of accountability to Arab politics" (Lynch, Voices 3). This has made Arab regimes more vulnerable to domestic calls for harsher stances towards the U.S., putting the heads of state who have declared themselves official allies of America in a very delicate situation. When state-controlled television stations were the only source of news in the region, these leaders were able to keep the nature of their dealings with the U.S. outside of the sphere of public discourse. Yet as people started to get their news from satellite channels, they have grown increasingly opinionated about the U.S. as an aggressor in the region, and have thus expressed a desire for their leaders to deal with the U.S. more sternly. The barging entry of satellite news channels in the region has thus shined a bright light on the nature of the ties between governments and the U.S. in each country, ending the "tacit agreement between the U.S. administration and certain allied Arab governments on the need to keep Arab public opinion out of politics, specifically in matters of foreign policy" (El Oifi, "Arabe").
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78 While popular pressure does not present a significant threat of government overthrow in a region where most countries are under authoritarian rule, there is still strong incentive for leaders to listen to popular opinion since not doing so could aggravate popular anger and create the need for the expenditure of coercive resources or greater repression to sustain power (Nisbet et al. 13). Thus by shaping their audiences' worldview into one based on a pan-Arab narrative, Arab satellite news channels have also had a certain effect on the strategic calculations of the region's politicians. The bottom line is that while no Arab regime has been forced to change its position towards the United States by this newly mobilized public, every Arab regime formulated its policies within "a set of assumptions, ideas, and beliefs that were conclusively shaped" by Arab satellite news channels (Lynch, Voices 69). More specifically, the reinforced anti-American public opinion brought on by Arab satellite news channels has thus made it more delicate for Arab leaders "to publicly cooperate with the United States on controversial policies such as the invasion of Iraq, and make it easier for them to resist US pressures" (Lynch, "anti" 199).
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79 CHAPTER 5: POLICY CONCLUSIONS: U.S. REACTIONS TO ARAB SATELLITE NEWS CHANNELS - PAST AND FUTURE After outlining the concrete ways in which Arab satellite news channels impact U.S. interests in the Middle East, I now turn to the question of how the U.S. has reacted to these actors thus far and what the U.S. can do to counter their reinforcing effect on anti-American opinions in the region. THE AMERICAN REACTION SO FAR: ANTAGONIZING RATHER THAN ENGAGING ARAB SATELLITE NEWS CHANNELS Attacks and Condemnations by the American Administration The U.S. reaction to Arab satellite news channels since their emergence as the premier news source in the Middle East has largely been a series of faux-pas. The U.S. stance towards these new actors of Arab media were somewhat positive in their early years, with spokesmen from the Department of State recognizing satellite channels as "powerful voices with a wide viewership" and a "media outlets of importance in the Arab world" (qtd. in Miles 94). Yet a marked change in American attitudes towards Arab satellite news channels took place after the attacks of September 11 th 2001 and the beginning of these networks' broadcasts of videos from Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and later of casualties caused by American attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. From this period onwards, Arab satellite news channels became the object of repeated attacks and condemnations by American officials. As Jeremy Scahill writes in The Nation, for the U.S. the transgression of these channels during the "war on terror" was "a simple one: being there".
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80 To give but a couple of examples, former Secretary of State Colin Powell called Al-Jazeera "horrible and slanted", while Richard Boucher, spokesman for the Department of State, said that Arab channels have "established a very clear pattern of false and inflammatory reporting" (Miles 323). Similarly, the White House repeatedly denounced the "war rhetoric of Al-Jazeera" in its daily press briefings (qtd. in Al-Jazeera). Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was by far the most virulent critic of Arab satellite channels, saying they "pound the people in the region with things that are not true" (qtd. in Control Room). Answering a question on Al-Jazeera's footage of civilian casualties induced by American bombs, Rumsfeld famously said: "what they do is when a bomb goes down they take a group of children and women and pretend it hit them [] They are a group of people who are perfectly willing to lie to the world to extend their credibility" (qtd. in Control Room), Yet beyond these antagonistic remarks, the very mindset adopted by American officials with regards to Arab satellite news channels was one of profound mistrust. These networks were considered the "enemy's television" rather than a valid source of information for millions of people throughout the Arab world. This attitude was perhaps best exemplified by Donald Rumsfeld's comments at the start of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. When questioned on the lack of U.S. cooperation with demands by Arab satellite news channels for interviews with spokesmen of the U.S. army, the former Secretary of Defense said that "our goal is not to demystify things for the other side" (qtd. in Miles 139).
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81 On a related note, it is rumored that American officials influenced the major American television networks to contribute to the smearing of Arab satellite news channels. This was done chiefly by prefacing any footage received through Arab satellite channels with warnings that the images cannot be independently confirmed, "as if to imply lingering, unanswered questions about [Arab channels'] professionalism" (Miles 149). Bombing Al-Jazeera's offices - A Costly "Mistake" Another tremendous American faux pas was the bombing of Al-Jazeera offices on two separate occasions, the first during an air raid on the channel's bureau in Kabul in November 2001 and the second on its Baghdad offices in March 2004, killing one of the channel's news correspondents (Beeston). The U.S. has called these incidents unfortunate mistakes, yet there is very little support for this, especially since Al-Jazeera had provided American forces with the exact coordinates of their locations in both cases, precisely to avoid being an unintended target ("Reporters"). Whatever the truth behind the attacks, the end result was the bolstering of Al- Jazeera's reputation among its viewers, as the bombings were widely interpreted as "a vengeful and deliberate strike" against journalists who were doing a solid job of reporting the truth rather than the American version of the war (Miles 164). More importantly, the bombings "left a lot of negative feeling among Al-Jazeera and Arab journalists in general", says Wadah Khanfar, the general manager of the Qatari network, likely reinforcing Arab networks' tendency to portray the United States in a negative light (qtd. in Al-Jazeera).
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82 Asking the Emir of Qatar to curb the tone of Al-Jazeera Yet another misstep in the American response to Arab satellite news channels came when Colin Powell asked the Emir of Qatar to leverage his influence to moderate the tone of Al-Jazeera's coverage on American operations in Afghanistan (Miles 122). The Emir then told the press that the U.S. had asked him to impose restraint on Al-Jazeera's editorial independence. He further said that he considered Al-Jazeera's coverage to be balanced, and that the channel's decision to air tapes from Osama Bin Laden was the right one to make since the Al-Qaeda leader is "a party to the conflict and [therefore] his opinions must be heard" (qtd. in Miles 123). More importantly, the Emir added that he had no intention whatsoever to interfere with Al-Jazeera, since, he stated, "parliamentary life requires you to have free and credible media", a pointed jab at the irony of leaders from the bastion of free press asking someone else to censor the media (Miles 123). Colin Powell's demand was thus a major mistake in two regards, first for the humiliation from the Emir's comments to the press, and secondly because it was widely interpreted by the Arab community as a show of American hypocrisy. As Ahmad Sheikh, an editor-in-chief at Al-Jazeera, told the Associated Press, "coming from the United States which considers itself the strongest advocate of freedom of expression, [this request was perceived] as strange and unacceptable [] it reveals the true face of [Washington's] hypocrisy" (qtd. in Miles 124).
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83 Arab Journalists Treated With Suspicion and Disrespect During the War in Iraq The U.S. further antagonized journalists from Arab satellite news channels during the war in Iraq by refusing to grant them the same level of access other journalists enjoyed with military officers. As Badreya Al-Jenaibi notes, "many reports coming from Arab journalists [embedded with American troops] were lacking in specific details and facts because they were not provided access" to the daily briefs for the media by military officers. Al-Jenaibi further writes that "added to the lack of access was an outright hostility shown to Arab journalists, based mostly on the perception that coalition forces had of their news stations". Thus when Amr El-Kakhy, an Al-Jazeera journalist who reported from the U.S. Central Command Center in Doha during the war in Iraq, asked American military officials why he wasn't included in the briefings that had been given to CNN and Reuters, he was told that Al-Jazeera was "a station with a reputation" and "the potential enemy's station" (qtd. in Tatham 125). Once again, the military officers' words nicely summarize the fundamental problem with the American perception and handling of Arab satellite news channels. Instead of perceiving these stations as a potential partner, they have most often been treated as foes. By treating these actors as enemies, the United States not only "risks losing a powerful potential ally for change, but also pushes these influential voices into a hostile camp" (Lynch, Voices 251). A crucial first step in the establishment of a better working rapport between the American government and Arab satellite news channels is thus for the U.S. to learn to see these networks as "the potential friend's stations".
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84 The NYSE Incident Another incident that further envenomed the relationship between the U.S. and Arab satellite news channels took place in March 2003, when the New York Stock Exchange asked Al-Jazeera's correspondents to turn in their press credentials and revoked their permission to broadcast from the floor of the exchange (Dadge 62). This came in the wake of Al-Jazeera's airing of footage showing US Prisoners of War in Iraq, but the decision by managers at one of the global symbols of the free market to prevent journalists from doing their job because of their news organization's editorial choices was universally decried both within and outside the U.S. as a prime example of American hypocrisy - "freedom of the press, yes, but only on our terms". While the NYSE quickly retreated from its position in light of the public outrage, the damage was done and this was yet another faux-pas in American relations with the Arab press. Saddam's Statue American officials' complete lack of knowledge on the ways in which Arab satellite news channels operate was also visible in April 2003, when Saddam Hussein's statue was toppled in the center of Baghdad. An American flag was placed atop the statue before it fell, and "although the flag was quickly removed and replaced by an Iraqi one, the damage had been done [] In the eyes of the Arab world, Baghdad had been conquered and not liberated" (Tatham 13). Al-Jazeera's voice-over commentary that accompanied the channel's coverage of the statue's toppling is strongly telling of Arab sentiments on that day: "the American soldier who approached on the back of a tank did not have the presence of mind to remember that he was on non-American soil. Maybe it was a deliberate insult, or maybe he acted out of ignorance. [] The statue toppled, but it did not fall fast. Even after
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85 it fell, [Saddam] still had his feet implanted in the reinforced Iraqi cement in the heart of Baghdad" (qtd. in Tatham 138). The event formed the main item of news bulletins across all Arab satellite news channels, and the image of an American flag draped over Saddam Hussein's statue was transmitted to tens of millions of Arab viewers, heavily contributing to "a sense of the humiliation of their Arab brothers and their fears of American imperialism" (Seib 606). The American army was clearly not obligated to topple the statue to secure victory in Baghdad (in fact it could be argued that U.S. forces should have focused on more important objectives), yet the decision was made to go ahead with it in order to create a symbolic marker for victory. Given the largely foreseeable nature of the Arab media's treatment of the statue's fall, the American decision to topple the statue in this way belies a fundamental misunderstanding of (or complete disregard for) the way in which Arab satellite news channels frame their coverage and affect their viewers. Culturally Insensitive Hearts and Minds Campaign A fundamental misunderstanding of how Arab satellite news channels function was also displayed in the video advertisement campaign launched in 2002 by the U.S. State Department to win over the hearts and minds of the Middle East. The campaign featured polished video segments highlighting the lives of Arab-Americans and promoting the idea of the U.S. as a "place where Muslims thrive" (Fandy 106). In the end, the campaign was a colossal waste of money, since no Arab satellite channel agreed to run it. Once more, U.S. actions showed a complete lack of understanding of the region, since the possibility that the ads would be rejected for political considerations had not even crossed the minds of State Department officials. In trying to propose a culturally sensitive solution to winning hearts and minds, the U.S. showed a blatant "ignorance of the very
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86 cultural and political setting in which they hoped to become convincing communicators" (Fandy 106). In summation, the above incidents all illustrate the profound rift that has grown between the American administration and Arab satellite news channels, largely as a result of U.S. responses to these networks. Just as these stations have been shown to have a reinforcing effect on their viewers' anti-American perceptions, so it can be said that the American reactions to and handling of Arab satellite news channels have likely reinforced these channels' negative treatment of the U.S. on their programs. THE FAILURE OF AL-HURRA Rather than engage the existing Arab satellite news channels, the Bush administration launched its own news network, along with a radio and an English- language magazine, as part of a multipronged public diplomacy campaign designed to reach Arab audiences directly (Nisbet et al. 16). This channel, called Al-Hurra (which translates into "the free one"), launched in January 2004 at a cost of more than $100 million (Miles 374). In remarks to the Library of Congress, President Bush said the new network would cut through the "hateful propaganda that fills the airwaves in the Muslim world" and broadcast "a message of tolerance and truth to tens of millions" (qtd. in Beehner). Brian Conniff, general manager for the channel, put things more bluntly in saying that Al-Hurra would "beam the U.S. perspective throughout the world" (qtd. in "War"). Yet all available studies and statistics point to a dismal failure of the channel since its launch.
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87 Low Audience, Lower Credibility While the channel's officials claim to have 20 million regular viewers, outside experts estimate the figure to be closer to a tenth of that, with some saying that Al-Hurra only attracts 1% of the regional audience (Gockel and Kraig 12). Poll results similarly point to a very low viewership, with one survey of 3, 300 adults across six Arab nations finding that "none cited Al-Hurra as their first choice television news station and only 3.8 percent of respondents cited it as their second choice" (Miles 379). Furthermore, in a 2007 Gallup poll of 1006 adults in Saudi Arabia, 24% of respondents thought the channel had a pro-Western bias, and a scarce 6% judged Al-Hurra to have comprehensive news coverage (Rheault). These numbers are illustrative of the high credibility gap which the channel faced from its very beginning as an official tool of the American government. This point is echoed by Talal Al Haj, the UN bureau chief for Al Arabiya, when he says that the direct link between the channel and the American administration greatly hurt its credibility among Arab viewers for whom it became "more or less no different from their own government stations" (Al Haj). Lionel Beehner expounds on this idea, pointing out that Al-Hurra's chances of success were heavily impaired from the start by Arab suspicions with regards to American foreign policy initiatives: "Washington [should have been] mindful of something every good salesman understands: If you do not trust the messenger, you do not trust the message".
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88 Factors That Further Reduced Al-Hurra's Credibility and Popularity Yet beyond the initial deficit of audience trust that Al-Hurra started with, the channel itself is responsible for a significant part of its failure with Arab viewers. For instance, unlike Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya, the staff at Al-Hurra is in no way representative of the vast diversity of the Arab world. In fact, the channel's employees are mostly Lebanese, and Maronite Christians at that, which almost automatically reduces the station's appeal and credibility in the eyes of an Arab Muslim audience (Fandy 112). In addition, Al-Hurra made several journalistic mistakes which further eroded the station's credibility with audiences. Mamoun Fandy notes one such incident when the network referred to a Shia demonstration against the American occupation in Iraq as birthday celebrations for powerful Shiite cleric Mustafa Al-Sadr. "They might have gotten away with this [if] it weren't for the fact that other Arab television stations, along with BBC Radio described the gathering as an anti-American demonstration. The [Al- Hurra] reports were [simply] not true" (Fandy 113). The station also showed an egregious disconnect with its audience in placing heavy emphasis on basketball during its sports segments while soccer is by far a more popular sport among Arab audiences (Fandy 115). These are but some of the examples of Al-Hurra's failings which further decreased the channel's credibility deficit with Arab audiences, leading many to lament the channel as compared to what it could have been. Tariq Al Humayd, editor of the influential pan- Arab paper Asharq al-Awsat, echoed this view, saying he and others had hoped that the station might "emerge as a voice of reason and a source of information and investigative reports at the level of those produced by the U.S. media". "The last thing we expected", he writes, "was that the United States would try to sell us its bad goods" (qtd. in Pein). It
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89 thus appears that Al-Hurra is largely an "expensive irrelevance" in the Arab media landscape today (Lynch, "Al-Hurra"). POLICY CONCLUSIONS In the course of this thesis thus far, I have explored the reasons for and means by which Arab satellite news channels reinforce their viewers' negative perceptions of American foreign policy, the ways in which this impacts U.S. interests in the Middle East, and the ineffectual ways in which the U.S. has responded to this new media. What follows is a set of policy conclusions regarding what could be done to ameliorate the portrayal of the United States on these channels. The Need for Increased Funding and a New Mindset to Drive American Public Diplomacy The first resounding conclusion that emerges from this study is that a fundamental reform is needed in the way the United States conducts its public diplomacy towards the Middle East, beginning with an engagement of Arab satellite news channels as the premier sources of information in the region. Before delving into the specifics of U.S. communication and outreach in the Middle East, it is important to note that public diplomacy seems to have become almost an afterthought in the American policy formulation process. The funding for American public diplomacy initiatives has fallen to drastically low levels, dropping by more than 50% (accounting for inflation) since the 1980s (Miles 373). The insufficiency of public funds for public diplomacy efforts is highlighted in a report from a 2003 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stating that "the aggregate amount devoted to communicating the American vision to the rest of the world [is] less than half
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90 of what some individual American companies, such as the Ford Motor Company or the Pepsi Corporation, spend on advertising each year" (U.S. Government 2). Moreover, the number of public diplomacy officers has been cut in half over the past decade while the use of technology has increased, such that "local foreign newspapers editors critical of U.S. policy no longer get visits from a press attach, let alone invitations to visit the United States, but instead receive mass-produced email messages assembled thousands of miles away" (Beehner). The insufficiency of funding for public diplomacy and the shortage of public diplomacy officers are not highlighted here because they pose a problem in and of themselves (even if they are important questions), but rather because they are highly indicative and revealing of the secondary consideration that has been given to public diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy in the Middle East over the past decade. There is thus a wide consensus among experts on the region that a seismic shift in American policy formulation is required for public diplomacy to become present at the creation of foreign policy rather than "something that comes afterward to sell a foreign policy or to respond to criticism after the fact" (Council 8). For instance, insight from surveys and polls could be leveraged to help define optimum tracks for foreign policy, or at least to be able to pre-empt the reaction of Arab media to American actions. More importantly, it is imperative that the U.S. grasp the significant role of Arab satellite news channels as the main purveyor of images that people use to define the United States. It is also important to understand the definitional power of the pan-Arab narrative that these channels have put in place, as well as the anti-American element that is built-in to this pan-Arab identity.
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91 Instead of reacting with virulent criticism of these channels as has been done thus far, the U.S. must learn to engage and be a part of the conversation held daily on Arab television screens. Indeed, the refusal to engage with Arab satellite news stations so far has backfired in several ways, most importantly by placing the U.S. outside the sphere of debate on Arab television screens. As Mark Lynch notes, the intense U.S. military presence in the Middle East has thus been "matched, oddly, with a relative American absence from the most important site of public political debate" ("anti" 201). By refusing to send representatives on these channels, the U.S. effectively deprived itself of "the means to respond effectively [to criticism]-or even to be a significant part of the conversation" (qtd. in Lynch, "anti" 201). This disregard for the Arab public sphere not only "fueled perceptions of the United States as arrogant and unilateralist, it also meant that negative images and false information often have gone unchallenged, allowing for the consolidation of a hostile consensus" towards the U.S. (Lynch, "anti" 201). Therefore, the United States should fully embrace the opportunity offered by Arab satellite news channels to reach a vast Arab audience, entering the Arab public sphere "as it really exists" rather than continuing to waste money on Al-Hurra which nobody watches (Lynch Voices 250). Similarly, Tom Mintier, a CNN correspondent during the war in Iraq, emphasizes the importance for the U.S. to accept Arab channels' oppositions to American presence in the region, learning to dialogue rather than trying to "manage the news in an unmanageable situation" (qtd. in Control Room). Frank Pascual, a Captain in the U.S. Navy, echoes this idea, saying that the U.S. should send representatives to the media organ that provides the greatest audience, regardless of its editorial line: "[Arabs]
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92 are the people we're looking to reach, and if Al-Jazeera gives us the opportunity to reach them, we need to talk with them" (qtd. in "War"). Continuing to ignore Arab satellite news channels would thus amount to "being unbelievably short-sighted and making a strategic mistake", in the words of former U.S. ambassador Mark Palmer ("Democracy"). Given that Arab networks have repeatedly deplored the dearth of American representatives on their shows despite constant invitations and an open-door policy for U.S. officials wanting to appear on the air, the lack of willingness to engage cannot be blamed on the networks and lies clearly on the American side. Michael Pelletier, a media officer for the US State Department, confirms this point in saying that the "responsibility rests on us to get our opinions out there, and that's what these [Arab news] channels want as well" (qtd. in "War"). The first crucial step in establishing a rapport of any sort between the U.S. government and the new Arab media is thus to take advantage of satellite channels' openness to U.S. officials and to send as many American representatives as possible to promote or at least explain U.S. actions to Arab viewers (Gockel and Kraig 8). The image of the U.S. would also benefit greatly if the American representatives sent to appear on these channels spoke Arabic and were familiar with the cultural codes and mores of Arab society. Hiring native Arabic speakers should thus be a priority for the U.S. State Department, which currently counts a scant 20 fluent Arabic speakers among a workforce of 30, 000 employees ("War"). In addition, U.S. officials who appear on Arab satellite news channels should be given more leeway to "communicate more freely, be more accessible, and respond more quickly" without needing to wait for proper approval from the chain of command
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93 (Gockel and Kraig 9). More importantly, the tone adopted when addressing the Arab media should be one of respect rather than defiance and superiority as was the case in some of the comments made by American officials thus far. In essence, the U.S. should provide the same recognition and access to Arab satellite news channels as are provided to American news outlets (Nisbet et al. 33). This would provide Arab journalists with better access to American sources, and it would be a good start towards bridging the gap of suspicion that has grown between the two parties. Another highly symbolic action that could be taken by the U.S. to close this gap would be to conduct and make public the results of a thorough investigation regarding the bombings of Al-Jazeera bureaus in Kabul and Afghanistan. Yet it is also worth highlighting that several laudable initiatives have already been launched by the US State Department, such as a Rapid Response Center in Washington D.C. where a team of analyst keeps a constant watch on 150 Arab satellite channels each day to see what's being said about America and be able to address urgent matters while they are still a part of the current news cycle ("War"). The State Department has also placed a media officer in Dubai to respond to the queries of Arab journalists (Khanfar). In light of the necessities set out above, these initiatives by State Department mark a start in the right direction, yet one that will only be fruitful if the U.S. government gives itself the means and drive to actually enter the Arab conversation. On a different note, another tactic that has been suggested to curb negative portrayals of the U.S. on Arab airwaves is shift the focus of Al-Hurra, gearing it away from the 24-hour news landscape where it is doomed to fail due its tremendous lack of credibility among Arab audiences. Instead, Mark Lynch suggests that the channel should
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94 fully embrace its status as an American-funded organization, focusing on C-Span type coverage of the inner workings of American government such as congressional hearings, candidate speeches for important elections and the like ("Advice"). Indeed, results from polls held across the Middle East show that Arab populations have a genuine interest in the nuts and bolts of how American democracy works, and the shows launched by Al- Jazeera and Al-Arabiya to cover American elections in 2004 met with tremendous success among viewers, belying a clear interest for U.S. politics. Yet despite the ratings successes of these shows, Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera both decreased their coverage of the American domestic political scene after the election, leaving it largely ignored and poorly covered on Arab satellite channels. Al-Hurra could thus derive a competitive advantage by positioning itself as the go-to news station for coverage of America and of American politics, giving viewers a "living-room view of the democratic process" (Cook). There is already a precedent for this, since Al-Hurra broadcast Donald Rumsfeld's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee after the revelations about torture at the Abu Ghraib prison. As Steven Cook writes in a New York Times editorial, "the spectacle of the secretary of defense of the United States answering questions from elected legislators about the conduct of American soldiers transfixed [millions of] Arabs". There thus seems to be genuine potential for Al-Hurra to succeed if it were reconverted into an Arabic-language C-Span channel. At the very least, Lynch writes, "this could challenge monolithic stereotypes about America; beyond that it could illuminate Arab political debates in new ways, and it could even be great TV" ("Advice"). If done well, this type of programming could thus show Arab viewers the complexity and diversity of American democracy, while also
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95 establishing Al-Hurra as a more prominent channel in the landscape of Arabic-language satellite television channels. As Well as a Change in American Foreign Towards the Middle East Yet public diplomacy initiatives such as the ones above are only likely to have a real effect if they are undertaken along with a profound reform of American foreign policy in the Middle East. As Barry Rubin notes, "U.S. policymakers should understand that various public relations efforts [or] acts of appeasement [will] not by themselves do away with Anti-Americanism; only when the systems that manufacture and encourage anti-Americanism [change] will popular opinion change". In other words, public diplomacy initiatives are incredibly important, but can only be as effective as the substantive policies that undergird them (Anti-Americanism). The best way for the U.S. to change the way it is portrayed on Arab satellite news channels is thus to address the root causes for anti-American sentiments in the Arab world. As has been stated repeatedly throughout this thesis, these channels first reflect and then reinforce pre-existing anti-American sentiments held by their viewers. The effect of Arab satellite news channels on their viewers' perceptions of the U.S. is thus one of "degree, not direction" (Nisbet et al. 32), and Arab opinions of America seem to be shaped much more by U.S. actions themselves rather than the way in which these actions are portrayed in the media. Ultimately, although Al-Jazeera and its cohorts are driven by a pan-Arab editorial line that is admittedly anti-American, these channels report the news. The Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the lies on Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction, the mishandling of the occupation in Iraq, U.S. support for Israel during the second intifada-these are but
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96 some of the examples of how American actions which have given Arab satellite news channels constant fodder for them to portray the U.S. in a negative light. Yet instead of focusing on changing the policies at the root of Arab discontent with America, the U.S. has preferred to blame-and shoot-the messenger. As Arab media analyst Abdallah Schleifer notes, "the Arab media became a convenient scapegoat for profound U.S. policy errors" (qtd. in Lynch, Voices 21). Yet surveys show that policy errors are precisely what is driving anti-American sentiments in the Arab world, indicating that the anti-Americanism at play in the Middle East is political rather than fundamental. This is good news, giving reason to believe that if American foreign policy evolves, so will popular opinion towards the U.S. in the Arab world. Similarly, should the U.S. truly re-evaluate its foreign policy to address the region's most pressing problems (Palestine and Iraq), Arab satellite news channels would most likely portray the U.S. in a fairer light. Indeed, having become increasingly driven by market share, it seems highly unlikely that these channels would give up credibility (and thus audience numbers) by maintaining an anti-American editorial line if the U.S. tackles the policy points at the heart of Arab anti-Americanism. This presupposes a radical change in the mindset driving the conduct of American foreign policy in the region, and a willingness to lead substantive policy discussions beyond the so-called "listening tours" American leaders are prone to conduct in the region (most recently with Secretary Rice's visit's to Egypt and the West Bank in March 2008). Karen Hughes, former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, perfectly exemplified the central problem in the American attitude when it comes to the
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97 Arab world during her first visit to the region, when she famously said that she was there to "do everything but talk about problems with U.S. policies" (Gockel and Kraig 21). Until American officials decide to do just that, there is very little likelihood for a change in Arab perceptions of the U.S. This is particularly true for the question of Palestine which lies at the crux of Arab contentions with the U.S. and features prominently on Arab satellite news coverage. As recently as February 2008, King Abdullah II of Jordan highlighted the salience of this issue in a speech at Princeton University, calling question of Palestine the "issue of our time" and the "core problem in the region", such that "the beginning of a long-term strategic partnership between the Arab world and the United States must begin with the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict". Because of the United States' historical support of Israel, Arabs perceive America as inextricably involved in the problems affecting Palestinians. Until a lasting peace is brokered between Israel and Palestine, no amount of public diplomacy will realistically be able to undo the damage being done to the reputation of the U.S. by "the vivid footage of the dead, injured and traumatized Palestinians being broadcast out of Gaza and the West Bank by the Arab media" (Tatham 29). As discussed previously, the coverage of the Palestinian question on Arab satellite news channels is especially intense as the subject is considered safe by Arab journalists, such that the prominence of Palestine on the airwaves is highly unlikely to decrease unless veritable progress is made to reduce the daily violence taking place there. Similarly, results from the 2002 Zogby poll show significant majorities (60% and over) of respondents who would react more favorably towards the United States if it "were to apply pressure to ensure the creation of an independent Palestinian state"
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98 (Zogby International, "Ten"). More broadly, in a 2004 survey of six Arab countries, the most frequently provided answer to the question of what the United States could do to improve its image in the Arab world was simply to "change [its] Middle East policy" (Linzer). All factors thus point to the conclusion that if the United States were to adopt appropriate policies, starting with brokering an equitable settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, Arab attitudes, and therefore the portrayal of the U.S. on Arab media, would likely change (Lynch, "anti" 223). In the words of Andrew Kilgore, former U.S. ambassador to Qatar, "a return to the time-honored tradition of fairness" in the conduct of American foreign policy would most likely "reverse the present tide of ill-will in [the] Middle East" (qtd. in Tatham 45). To give but one example of a U.S. action which could send a strong signal of a return to a certain sense of morality and fairness in the conduct of American foreign policy, Robert Keohane cites the possibility of closing down the U.S. prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Keohane highlights that this would not come without cost, as it would involve releasing suspected terrorists, yet it could have a tangible symbolic impact and be a strong show of good will to the Arab world (Anti-Americanism). Yet as I stated in the introduction to this thesis, the use of the terms "Arab world" and "Middle East" belies a somewhat simplistic treatment of this region as though it were a single block. In fact, when the political, cultural, and socioeconomic differences between the countries that make up the Middle East are taken into consideration, along with the fact that anti-U.S. sentiments in these nations are often the conflation of popular frustrations with several domestic problems, it becomes clear that there is no universal fix to eliminate anti-Americanism in all Arab countries. And while a major reform in U.S.
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99 public diplomacy and foreign policy towards the Middle East would likely have a significant reducing effect on anti-American sentiments in the region, it is important to acknowledge that nothing can be done to completely eliminate anti-Americanism in this part of the world. With that said, another methodological note in the introduction to this thesis concerned the fact that the same presidential administration has been in place in the U.S. throughout almost all of the time frame under consideration in this analysis. Given the tremendous interest in American politics throughout the Arab world, Arab satellite news channels have already begun and will continue to provide heavy coverage of the steps leading to the election of a new president of the United States in November 2008. This is a historic opportunity for the U.S. to present a new face to the Arab world, and the new president will likely have a brief window of opportunity during which Arab satellite news channels will refrain from criticism while Arabs make their first impression of the new American leadership. This honeymoon period is not to be wasted. This thesis has sought to analyze the means by which Arab satellite news channels reflect and invigorate anti- American sentiments in the Arab world that are largely based on American foreign policy. The change in American leadership presents new hope that the rhythm of Arab public opinion towards the United States can beat to a different drum.
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101 "Arab TV Guide." Wide Angle: Dishing Democracy. PBS Online. 7 Feb. 2008 . Ayish, Muhammad. "The Changing Face of Arab Communications: Media Survival in the Information Age." Mass Media, Politics & Society in the Middle East. Ed. Kai Hafez. New Jersey, Hampton Press, 2001. 111-36. Ayish, Mohammed. "Political Communication on Arab World Television: Evolving Patterns." Political Communication 19(2002):137-54. Bahry, Louay Y. "The New Arab Media Phenomenon: Qatar's Al-Jazeera." Middle East Policy 8.2(2001): 88-99. "BBC/Reuters/Media Center Poll: Trust in the Media." Globescan 3 May 2006. 10 Feb. 2008 . Beehner, Lionel. "Perceptions of U.S. Public Diplomacy." Council on Foreign Relations. 29 Sep. 2005. 1 Feb 2008 . Beeston, Richard. "US sees Al-Jazeera as voice of terror." The Times. 25 Nov. 2005. 2 Feb. 2008. . Blake, Mariah. "From All Sides: In the Deadly Cauldron of Iraq, Even the Arab Media Are Being Pushed Off the Story." Columbia Journalism Review 2(2005). 24 Jan 2008 .
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103 El Oifi, Mohammed. L'opinion publique arabe entre logiques tatiques et solidarits transnationales. Raisons politiques 3.19(2005): 45-62. El Oifi, Mohammed. "Opinions publics et processus politiques dans le monde Arabe." La dmocratie est-elle soluble dans l'Islam? Ed. Judith Cahen. Paris : CNRS Editions, 2007. 187-202. Elmenshawy, Mohamed. "Silencing Arab Media." International Herald Tribune 1 Mar 2008: 5. English, Cynthia. "In Mideast, North Africa, Views of Powerful Nations Differ." 17 Nov 2007. Gallup Inc. 14 Feb 2008. . Fam, Mariam. "Cribs and Calls to Prayer Share Time in Mideast." The Wall Street Journal 23 Nov 2007: B1. Fandy, Mamoun. (Un)civil War of Words: Media and Politics in the Arab World. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007. Fergany, Nader. "Le dfi de la gouvernance dmocratique dans les pays arabes". La dmocratie est-elle soluble dans l'Islam? Ed. Judith Cahen. Paris : CNRS Editions, 2007. 203-229. Francona, Rick. "Who is an Arab?" Middle East Perspectives 4 April 2007. 10 Jan 2008. . Friedman, Thomas L. "Arabs at the Crossroads." The New York Times 3 Jul 2002. 6 Apr 2008d.
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106 Jorisch, Avi. Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hezbollah's Al-Manar Television. Washington D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004. Kaplan, Fred. "Daydream Believers." Slate 4 Feb. 2008. 4 Feb. 2008. . Khanfar, Wadah. Interview. Frontline World. PBS. March 2006. 5 Jan. 2008 . Kilani, Sa'eda. Freedom Fries: Fried Freedoms. Amman: Arab Archives Institute, 2004. Klaehn, Jeffery. "A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model.'" Filtering the News; Essays on Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model. Ed. Jeffery Klaehn. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005. 1-20. Lamont, Ned. "How Al-Jazeera Helped Create a Middle East Mainstream Media." 15 Dec. 2007. Middle East Online. 1 Feb 2008. . Lang, Thomas. "Aboubakr Jamai on Fighting Moroccan Govenrment Censorship and How Al-Jazeera Fosters a Culture of Debate." Columbia Journalism Review 2 Feb 2008. . Linzer, Dafna. "Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S." The Washington Post. 23 July 2004: A26. Lynch, Mark. "Advice for Al-Hurra". Abu Aardvark 22 Oct. 2006. 1 Feb 2008 .
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107 Lynch, Mark. "Al-Hurra Controversy: One Good Thing." Abu Aardvark 10 May 2007. 1 Feb 2008. . Lynch, Mark. "Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World." Anti-Americanisms in World Politics. Ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2007. 196-224. Lynch, Marc. "Losing Hearts and Minds." Foreign Affairs 28 April 2004. Lynch, Marc. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera and Middle East Politics Today. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006. Maiola, Giovanna and David Ward. "Democracy and Media in Palestine: A Comparison of Election Coverage by Local and Pan-Arab Media." Arab Media and Political Renewal. Ed. Naomi Sakr. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. 96-117. Makdisi, Ussama. "Anti-Americanism in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History." The Journal of American History 89.2(2002): 538-557. "Middle East and North Africa Data Profile." World Development Indicators Database. April 2007. The World Bank Group. 3 Mar 2008. . Miles, Hugh. Al-Jazeera: The Inside Sotry of the Arab News Channel that is Challenging the West. New York: Grove Press, 2005. Nelson, Emily. "Camera Angles: Battle for Viewers Colors TV Picture Coming From Iraq." The Wall Street Journal 4 April 2003: A.1.
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109 Rheault, Magali. "International Television Receives High Marks in Saudi Arabia." 11 Oct. 2007. Gallup Inc 10 Feb. 2008 . Rinnawi, Khalil. Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera and Transnational Media in the Arab World. Lanham: University Press of America, 2006. Rubin, Barry. "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism." Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2002. Rugh, William A. Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004. Sahraoui, Sofiane, and Mohamed Zayani. The Culture of Al-Jazeera: Inside an Arab Media Giant. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2007. Sakr, Naomi. "Approaches to Exploring Media-Politics Connections in the Arab World." Arab Media and Political Renewal. Ed. Naomi Sakr. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. 1-12. Sakr, Naomi. Arab Television Today. London: I.B. Tauris, 2007. Sakr, Naomi. "Challenger or lackey? The politics of news on Al-Jazeera.". Media on the Move: Global Flow and Contra-Flow. Ed. Daya Kishan Thussu. London: Routledge, 2007. 116-133. Sakr, Naomi. "Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East." Middle East Report 210 (1999): 6-8. Scahill, Jeremy. "The War on Al-Jazeera." The Nation. 19 Dec 2005. 1 Feb 2008. .
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110 Seib, Philip. "Hegemonic No More: Western Media, the Rise of Al-Jazeera, and the Influence of Diverse Voices." International Studies Review 7 (2005): 601-615. Shefa, A. "Egyptian Intellectuals Speak Out Against Muslim Brotherhood Movement and its Slogan Islam is the Solution'". Middle East Media Research Institute 28 Feb 2006. 1 Apr. 2008 . Starr, Paul. The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications. Basic Books: New York, 2004. Sullivan, Sarah. "Al-Jazeera: The Courting of Al-Jazeera." Transnational Broadcasting Studies Journal 7(2001). 3 Jan 2008 . Susser, Asher. "The Decline of the Arabs". Middle East Quarterly Fall 2003. 10 Jan. 2008 . Tatham, Steve. Losing Arab Hearts and Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera and Muslim Public Opinion. London: Hurst & Company, 2006. Tessler, Mark. "Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research." International Studies Perspectives 4 (2003): 175-180. Tessler, Mark. "The Contribution of Public Opinion Research to an Understanding of the Information Revolution and its Impact in North Africa and Beyond." The Information Revolution and the Arab World: Its Impact on State and Society. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Abu Dhabi, UAE: British Academic Press, 1998. 73-91.
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Written in the wind
Being horny and dumb is now ubiquitous. It could be democracy’s finest hour. Or we could be screwed. History will tell, but I suspect it’s the latter. We have two reports. Three, if you count the yellow copter. If you hang around people in their twenties and thirties the way I do (they’re hot), you ...
The Consequences of Walking Away From a Mortgage
I hope this post doesn’t apply to you. That is, I hope you’re not in—or at risk of—foreclosure. We all know there are still a lot of foreclosures out there. As a Realtor, it’s especially obvious. Every time I drive to one of my short sale listings it seems like there are two new foreclosures on the ...
Financial Margin
Financial margin is something we all want and need in order to stay focused on the far more important things in our lives! #1 – Reduce interest rates on existing debt This escapes many people because the interest rate of debt is usually “out of sight –out of mind”, but it could very well be the grea ...
2012 Goals
SHORT TERMGOALS - Goals that may be achieved in one year or less Value: Security/Freedom D and L’s Goal: - By December 31, 2012, invest maximum of $17,000 in 401(k) - Set aside at least $2K each month - Explore the option of Refinancing our home loan - Make extra mortgage payment at end of year - Sa ...
Pioli wont discuss Manning but acknowledges interest in Orton – Sporting News
INDIANAPOLISScott Pioli refused to say Friday whether the Chiefs have interest in Peyton Manning, though the general manager said discussions have taken place with free agent quarterback Kyle Orton to provide competition for Matt Cassel., Printable Spelling Homework Rubric, Pirates Dinner Adventure ...
How Much Will I Need to Retire?
Knowing how much money you will need to have after you stop working, either coming in as a stream of income or from your retirement savings is one of the most important financial questions of your life. Of course, estimating the amount of cash that you will realistically require in order to successf ...
Is it cheaper to buy than rent? Yes. Really? YES.
Recently, news reports and friends have said its now cheaper to buy than rent in some places. Hard to believe. But is it true? Yes. Absolutely. 2011 was a brutal year for real estate sales. As a result, there are a lot of incredible deals out there. Sure, there are foreclosures, auctions, short sale ...
Comparing Cost of Living | Use CNN Money Calculator
My condition gets inflamed when people who live in this perfectly good mid-sized metro talk about "the big city" as though it is so superior. ...
World's most expensive cities led by Tokyo, London - Jun. 14, 2004
Those three cities ranked as the most expensive in the world, according to the latest annual cost-of-living survey released Monday by Mercer Human Resource ...
The cost of living - CNN.com
Living; Money; Sports; Time.com; Video; iReport; Impact ... The cost of living ... © 2009 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
Best Places to Live 2011 - Top 100: Town details: Hanover, NH ...
Now take charge of your financial life: Like Money magazine ... Median home price: $355,000 1: $265,929: Average ... © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights ...
Cost of living: Does $250,000 make you rich? - CNNMoney.com
The White House says you’re wealthy if you make $250k a year. But what about cost of living? You would need $545k in New York to maintain the same lifestyle that $ ...
Salary.com survey: Where paychecks go the farthest - May. 23, 2005
NEW YORK (CNN/Money) – Pride aside, it really doesn't matter how much you make, just so long as it goes a long way where you live.
Cost of Living Calculator: Compare prices in two cities - CNNMoney
Thinking of moving? CNNMoney shows how far your salary will go in another city with our cost of living calculator.
Calculators, Estimators, and Planners - Real Estate, Retirement ...
Cost of living comparison; Mortgage refinance calculator ... Give the Gift of Money; Reprints; Special Sections ... © 2012 Cable News Network. A Time Warner Company. All Rights ...
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Find the latest CNN news and video about personal life, work life, home ... Travel; Opinion; iReport; Money; Sports ... © 2012 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System ...
Cost of Living: News & Videos about Cost of Living - CNN.com
... that beneficiaries will receive a 3.6% cost-of-living ... NEW YORK (CNN/Money) - More than 52 million ... © 2012 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
Larwyn's Linx: Here’s An Idea For Chuck The Schmuck And Bob Casey
Send us tips! Bloggers: install a Larwyn's Linx widget. Get real-time news, 24/7, at BadBlue. Nation Here’s An Idea For Chuck The Schmuck And Bob Casey: HayRide Who funds the fund watchers?: Beacon AZ Gov. Expands Most Innovative School Choice Model in U.S.: Foundry Vetting Obama: Born in Kenya?: Ni ...
One Last Drink
One Last Drink by: Dex Walker We buried the last like the rest; submerged in the dark water fastened with bricks and sent down stream, knowing that what looked and felt final to us was not in fact final. I could hear the rapids and guessed that after about 250 yards he would come into a rocky pass, ...
The meaning and necessity of revolution in the 21st century
The meaning and necessity of revolution in the 21st century By Jerome Roos On May 11, 2012 The global day of action on May 12 will mark the resurgence of our resistance. But what is the way forward for our movement in these times of crisis? This is the transcript of a presentation given at the OVNI ...
Caricature/Cartoon – Mark Zuckerberg and Facebook’s IPO – Why Should he be the One?
It’s easy to awe this caricaturist. You just need to be a Leonardo Da Vinci, an Albert Einstein, a Steve Jobs, or a Mark Zuckerberg. Presenting Mark Zuckerberg, the coder who decoded our lives by creating Facebook and in the process became one of the most talked about people in the world of business ...
Billionaire denounces potential Rev. Wright ad
(CNN) – Billionaire Joe Ricketts on Thursday rejected an ad proposal by high-profile Republicans billed as a provocative campaign against President Barack Obama that would run around the Democratic National Convention. Earlier Thursday The New York Times reported Republican strategists were working ...
Here We Go Again…
The President has come forward to say that his view of same-sex marriage has evolved to the point where he is now in support of same-sex marriage. Thank God we have a President who is able to speak the truth about his beliefs, even when they change, and when they are in conflict with the viewpoint o ...
Long-term Unemployment: Challenges and Solutions in National News
Reuters and CNN Money recently published a couple of articles on long-term unemployment, a subject we've discussed before on this blog. In April 2012, 37 percent of unemployed* Oregonians had been without work for more than 27 weeks, compared with 41 percent of the U.S. unemployed population. In add ...
Facebook 今天晚上首次公开售股：你有兴趣吗？
今天晚上是属于你可能每天都上的网站的大日子。噢， 不好意思，我不是说谷歌(Google)。你会喜欢它，因为你的朋友会在那里跟你打招呼，你也可以把朋友的名字标贴在照片上。如果这个世界现在没有了Facebook，你可以想象会变成怎样吗？ 早在公司定出的上市日期前，投资者及旁观者已经对它产生浓厚的兴趣，很多人都希望可以希望能分得一杯羹。 我可以在此大谈Facebook的历史，它是怎样从其创办人马克扎克伯格（Mark Zuckerberg）的哈佛宿舍里诞生及发展到今时今日的受欢迎程度，但我觉得这些其实不大重要。或许你可以想想你是怎样开始用Facebook，与其他社交网站(像Friendster，不大熟 ...
40 Years...It's Apparently Official.
In honor of my Class of 1972, I've put together a bullet-point list of what was going on our senior year, from September, 1971 to June, 1972. With the help of Wikipedia, which, if we've learned ANYTHING from Michael Gary Scott, we know is faultless, here are a couple of bullets from each month of ou ...
Mitt Romney And Bain Capital
I begin this post with my apologies for saying that Mitt Romney was nothing more than a hatchet man as he also spent his time establishing businesses that would make a profit of gross proportions for himself and his friends, as well.Speaking for most of the people I speak for, I don’t think anyone b ...
Only on AM – MONEY Magazine reveals list of the 100 best small ...
Reporters for MONEY magazine recently spent months combing through information about America's small towns (those with populations of less than 50,000) to ...
Money Magazine: News & Videos about Money Magazine - CNN.com
Money Magazine: Want to invest in a startup? updated: Mon May 07 2012 09:33:00. Just got off the CNN Express, the mighty bus I ride to some of the less ...
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Best Places to Live 2009 - Top 100: 76-100 - from MONEY Magazine
CNNMoney's Best Places database of 1,800-plus U.S. cities includes towns with populations 8,500 to 50,000 with satisfactory education and crime scores, where income ...
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Have you found a way to save money on health care? MONEY magazine would like to hear about it. Despite recent government efforts, health care costs are ...
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Best Places to Live 2011 - Top 100: 1-25 - from MONEY Magazine
MONEY Magazine's annual ranking of the best places to live in America. See the top 100 towns, plus an online-only database with stats for more than 1,800 U.S. towns.
Best Places to Live 2011 - from MONEY Magazine
MONEY Magazine's annual ranking of the best places to live in America. See the top 100 towns, plus an online-only database with stats for more than 1,800 U.S. towns.
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Black money probe: Pranab Mukherjee to give details - NDTV


IBNLive.com
Black money probe: Pranab Mukherjee to give details
NDTV
PTI | Updated: May 21, 2012 08:21 IST New Delhi: Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee is likely to table White Paper on black money in Parliament today, providing information about black money stashed abroad. The Opposition, led by the BJP, ...
White paper on black money likely to be tabled todayIBNLive.com
FM to table White Paper on black money in Parl todayFirstpost
Buying property, jewellery? Govt may ask for receiptsHindustan Times
Hindu Business Line
all 21 news articles »

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China Money Rate Trades Near 1-Year Low on Rate-Cut Expectation - Bloomberg


China Money Rate Trades Near 1-Year Low on Rate-Cut Expectation
Bloomberg
China's benchmark money-market rate traded near the lowest level in 12 months on speculation the central bank will lower interest rates to support economic growth. Morgan Stanley economists led by Helen Qiao said the central bank may cut both lending ...

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White House Balances Money, Security In Afghanistan - NPR


Globe and Mail
White House Balances Money, Security In Afghanistan
NPR
So as we just heard, this NATO summit will be crucial when it comes to working out who's going to put up the money needed to support and train Afghan security forces in the years to come. The White House is leading the charge, so next we go to Ben ...
Afghanistan's Karzai thanks Obama for 'your taxpayers' money'ABC News
Canada Faces Pressure to Commit More Money to Fund Afghanistan Army and PoliceOttawa Citizen (blog)
NATO shifts to help an elusive Afghanistan peaceAtlanta Journal Constitution
Globe and Mail -Deutsche Welle
all 9,560 news articles »

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On Looser Money, China's Wen Says Now - Forbes


On Looser Money, China's Wen Says Now
Forbes
Investors should assume Beijing will do what it says, and that is to expect more pro-growth fiscal and monetary policy but no wall-of-money strategy being thrown into fixed asset investments like we saw in 2008-09.

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Facebook's nice-to-have problem: All that money - msnbc.com


msnbc.com
Facebook's nice-to-have problem: All that money
msnbc.com
As of Friday, Facebook's CEO Mark Zuckerberg now has even more money to throw around. According to Facebook's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the company expects to have about $10.3 billion in cash after it sells stock to the ...

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Ohio to track classroom money, student performance - MiamiHerald.com


Ohio to track classroom money, student performance
MiamiHerald.com
By JULIE CARR SMYTH AP COLUMBUS, Ohio -- The political fire still burns in Ohio to push more public money into classrooms, even after other states have backed off the idea amid evidence it does little to improve kids' grades.

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Here's a 7-step blueprint for a happy marriage, money-wise - Detroit Free Press


Here's a 7-step blueprint for a happy marriage, money-wise
Detroit Free Press
1 reason marriages end in divorce: money problems. Everyone knows, or should know, this. But love and a reluctance to take a hard look at our own financial habits, often keep us from seeing, much less confronting, potential financial troubles in a ...

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